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Liberal Hegemony?
School Vouchers and the Future of the Race
Harry G. Hutchison*
The liberal-legalist order... will be founded on self-interested, rights-
bearing, adversarial individuals and this will not be sustainable. This type of
social order is likely to aggravate precisely those points of tension in society
which any vibrant political process should aim at alleviating. The ultimate
danger is that liberal-legalism may, paradoxically, bring about the precise
end-despotism--which it is designed to avoid.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade ago, Girardeau Spann argued that the "present Supreme
Court has been noticeably unreceptive to legal claims asserted by racial
minorities... [consistent with] the popular perception... [that] a politically
conservative majority wishing to cut back on the protection [that] minority
interests receive at majority expense now dominates the Supreme Court."2
Paradoxically, the Court's recent decision affirming the constitutionality of
school vouchers3 as a component of a multifaceted program to provide improved
educational opportunities, largely to black children in a failed school district,
4
implies that the "liberal" minority of the Court may be inclined to preclude
programs which could protect and nurture minority interests, in a first-rate as
opposed to simply a public education. Whether the liberal wing of the Court is
2. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1971 (1990).
3. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
4. Id. at 644. But see id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he wide range of
choices that have been made available to students within thepublic schoolsystem has no
bearing on the question whether the State may pay the tuition for students who wish to
reject public education entirely and attend private schools that will provide them with a
sectarian education.") (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 68
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correct or incorrect, their views and those of the majority may simply be part of
a prevailing, confusing5 and strained conception of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment,6 that may not only have a disparate impact on black
Americans and other outsiders but may also be attached to unconscious racial
subordination.7
The Zelman decision has led to, and was preceded by, a firestorm both
within and outside the Court. "Only a few years ago, the idea of allowing parents
greater freedom to choose their children's schools was considered unnecessary,
unrealistic, and even undesirable by some."8 Today, "[a]lmost everyone agrees
that our schools are failing. Achievement is down, violence is up, and no amount
of money seems to insulate schools from these trends."9 "Fifty-eight percent of
low-income 4th graders cannot read, and 61 percent of low-income 8th graders
cannot do basic math. The magnitude of this educational malpractice is
staggering: of the roughly 20 million low-income children in K-12 schools, 12
million aren't even learning the most elementary skills."' 0 "The repeated failure
of political reforms to cure the ills of poorly performing government schools has
5. One commentator notes, "The Court's inconsistency pervades more than just the
results of the cases .... and commentators have found the area hopelessly confused."
William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It ": The Supreme Court Establishment,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 496-97 (1986).
6. I concede that the "amount of academic commentary on the Establishment
Clause and on the religion clauses in general has been enormous." Robert A. Sedler,
Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation,
43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1318 n.l (1997). Evidently, "virtually all the commentators
agree that there is something seriously wrong with the Court's approach to the resolution
of Establishment Clause issues." Id. at 1318-19. At least one "common thread running
through this criticism is that the Court has failed to develop and articulate an underlying
theory as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause and its function in our
constitutional system." Id. at 1319.
7. For an illuminating discussion of the possibility and power of unconscious
racism, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("Traditional notions of
intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part
by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain
outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes
are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and
wishes.").
8. Matthew J. Brouillette, The Case for Choice in Schooling: Restoring Parental
Control of Education, A MACKINAC CENTER REPORT, Feb. 2001, at 3, available at
http://www.mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=3236 (also available from the Mackinac Center
for Public Policy, 140 West Main Street, P.O. Box 568, Midland, Michigan 48640).
9. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 131, 156 (1995).
10. Adam Meyerson, Foreword to SAMUELCASEYCARTER, NOEXCUSES: LESSONS
FROM 21 HIGH-PERFORMING, HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS 1 (2000).
2003]
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led to widespread frustration among parents, students, teachers, and other
education professionals.""
Given the contemporary circumstances facing many minorities, and African-
Americans in particular,12 uncertainty continues to evolve pertaining to the
efficacy of "progressive" and "liberal" educational paradigms grounded in the
common public school. Although public schools have wrested dominance from
locally controlled and often family oriented private community schools over the
past 150-160 years of American history,' 3 the number of black Americans age
twenty-five to thirty-four with nine to eleven years of education who receive
public assistance continues to hover at or above twenty percent, while the
corresponding figure for whites drifts below ten percent.'4 Despite sporadic
reports of progress, the average mathematics and reading scores for blacks
continues to lag significantly in comparison with those for whites.'5 Meanwhile,
the "size of the black underclass has grown disproportionately as well: in 1995,
45 percent of all black children [were] born at, or beneath, the poverty line."' 6
Thus, "[flew issues are more important to the future than the education of
our children, and few proposed reforms would do more to improve education
than those that would create a truly vibrant, competitive, accountable and hence,
choice-driven educational marketplace."' 7 Today, publicly financed school
choice' 8 has become the centerpiece of discussions about educational reform. '
Whatever side is taken in this emerging wrangle, both opponents and proponents
speak disconsolately about dangers associated with the opposing view. Danger
to society. Danger to the wall of separation between church and state. Danger
to African-American children who are often deprived of educational opportunity
by failed or failing school systems. Danger to disadvantaged children if
11. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 3.
12. For example, "[t]he percentage of black children in poverty rose from thirty-
nine to forty-six percent during the period from 1974 to 1993, and the percentage of the
black population living in so-called 'under-class' areas has increased by more than fifty
percent during the period from 1970 to 1990." Harry Hutchison, Toward a CriticalRace
Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth,
Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 94 (1997).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 191 (2002).
15. Id. at 180-81.
16. HENRY Louis GATES, JR. & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE, at xii
(1996).
17. Lawrence W. Reed, A New Direction for Education Reform, IMPRIMIS, July
2001, available at http://www.mackinac.org/print.asp?ID=3541.
18. Admittedly, vouchers also exist in a privately financed form. In fact, the great
majority of voucher programs are privately financed. See, e.g., Gary Rosen, Are School
Vouchers UnAmerican?, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE, Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cfo/m1 061/2_ 109/59270719/print.jhtml.
19. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 3.
[Vol. 68
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purportedly ill-informed parents are allowed to choose the educational venue for
their child.2" Danger, perhaps to democracy. Whatever the merits of the present
debate and whatever its source, it is imperative to recall that "[d]angers to a
society may be mortal without being immediate. One such danger [may be] the
prevailing social vision of our time-and the dogmatism with which the ideas,
assumptions, and attitudes behind that vision are held."'" This admonition
contests self-congratulatory, liberal dogmatism as a basis for social policy, and
likely applies with equal force to judicial decision-making, especially within the
heated space occupied by the First Amendment. Within this contested terrain,
commentators and judges often congratulate themselves about unverifiable
insights, including the divisiveness of religious practice, the asserted yet
unproven tolerance generated by the common public school, the imaginary wall
of separation between church and state, and the public versus private dichotomy,
which some see as a bulwark against fragmentation. While some "critical legal
studies scholars and feminists [target] the public/private divide as an illusory and
mystifying element of liberal legalism,"22 the unverifiable insights ofjudges and
commentators, taken either together or separately, evidently trump the interests
of often excluded and subordinated Americans.
On one level this debate heralds the outworking of Hobbesian theory,
23
which includes but is not limited to the establishment of a "corrosive,
irreconcilable, and proliferating conflict between government and family. ' 24 As
thus conceived, "[m]odern democratic states have themselves become weapons
in the war of all against all, as rival interest groups compete with each other to
capture government and use it to seize and redistribute resources among
20. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Social Services and the Market, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1405, 1429-30 (1983).
21. THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS
A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1995); see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,739 (1985) ("It is simply self-congratulatory to suppose
that the members of our own persuasion have reached their convictions in a deeply
reflective way, whereas those espousing opinions we hate are superficial.").
22. See Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between
Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV.
1061, 1080 (2000).
23. JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (1993)
(stating that the lesson of Hobbesian theory for us is that the modem state is weak
because it aims too high and has grown too large).
24. STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLING, at vii (1986); see also William Ross, The Contemporary Significance of
Meyers and Piercefor Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV.
177, 177 (2000) ("The appropriate relationship between government and parents in the
education of children is an issue that has created recorded controversy since Plato
advocated the communal rearing of children.").
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themselves."25 If this conception is persuasive, then it follows that the "modem
state has recreated in a political form that very state of nature from which it is the
task of the state to deliver us." 6 These conflicts are not simply economic in
origin.27 "All modem democracies, but especially the United States, have
transformed the state into an arena of doctrinal conflicts, wherein.., contending
political movements vie for supremacy."28 Part of this struggle includes the
difficulty of incorporating both minorities and adherents to non-homogenizing
beliefs within a republic. Although it may be possible to create a picture of a
pluralist democracy that may be presupposed by Carolene Products'29 distinctive
argument for minority rights as part of a republic in which myriad pressure
groups, each typically representing a fraction of the population, bargain with one
another for mutual support, such an approach fails to deal adequately with
minority groups who find themselves in politically ascendant coalitions much less
often than otherwise comparable groups.3 While pluralists imply that judicial
protection can rightly be defended on a countermajoritarian basis,3 this theory
remains ineffective when and if the courts themselves are captured and captivated
by the prevailing operational dogma. This possibility leads inexorably to the
principle of minority acquiescence, which requires the minority to lose even
when the majority is deeply wrong.32 It therefore remains far from clear that the
interests of either ethnic or religious minorities are likely to prevail if and when
the terms of the voucher debate or any other debate are dominated by liberal
rhetoric and/or republican faith."
25. GRAY, supra note 23, at 4.
26. GRAY, supra note 23, at 4.
27. GRAY, supra note 23, at 4.
28. GRAY, supra note 23, at 4.
29. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
30. Ackerman, supra note 21, at 720.
31. Ackerman; supra note 21, at 720.
32. Ackerman, supra note 21, at 719.
33. What constitutes liberal theory and rhetoric exceeds the scope of this enterprise.
It is possible that we simply know it when we see it. In any case, liberalism resists easy
categorization but, generally, it seems to encompass concern for individual rights and
human autonomy. On Brian Bix's account, "[ljiberals and libertarians ground their
theories of justice on an analysis which treats people as essentially atomistic: in this
view, an individual is, essentially, just a metaphysical will, an ability to choose any form
of good, any set of values . . . . The conventional [liberal] view of society is that
government is there to protect individual rights.., and to resolve disputes between
individual claims." BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 105 (1999).
What it looks like within the contested area of First Amendment jurisprudence includes,
but is not cabined by, attempts to limit the reach of religion; to insist that government be
neutral among competing moral and theological visions, that political authority be
justified without reference to religious sanction, and that religion should be confined to
private life and be deprived of a public role. See, e.g, Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of
Conscience or Freedom of Choice, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE
[Vol. 68
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On another level, this often baffling debate mirrors the metaphoric quality
of Ralph Ellison's pathbreaking book Invisible Man.34 African-Americans and
other outsiders inhabit a world led largely by individuals and groups who loudly
affirm their profound concern for the true interests of blacks while
simultaneously demurring when the opportunity arises to deal with such concerns
in a visible as opposed to an idealistic way. This metaphoric quality
incontestably applies to endless Supreme Court elucidations about the meaning
of religious liberty-especially when and if the Court asserts that the possibility
of improved educational opportunities for African-Americans must be thwarted
by the purported disestablishmentarianism of the Founders. We must confront
the odd, even "remarkable spectacle of these nine characters, swishing around
in priestly robes in a building resembling a Greek temple and engaged in the
endless exegesis of a sacred text-and then having the chutzpah of insisting that
there is no establishment of religion in America."3 Some of the ground of the
debate may reflect pervasive fundamentalism.36 It is far from clear that such
fundamentalism is solely a vice of the religious." "The social psychology of all
fundamentalism, religious or secular, holds no great enigmas. Its core motive is
what Erich Fromm called the 'escape from freedom'-the flight into an
illusionary and necessarily intolerant certitude from the insecurities of being
human."3  Agents of public orthodoxy struggle to provide meaning by
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74,74-92 (James
Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) (assessing liberal theory). I concede that
some observers contend that both republicanism and liberalism coexisted for some time
in American history and that republicanism has made a comeback. Nevertheless, an
accurate depiction ofrepublicanism must admit its historical association with elitism and
exclusionary limits on citizenship. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 9, at 133-37. Whether
republicanism can be seen as separate from liberalism is debatable. For instance, one
republican writer implies, "Society must indoctrinate children so they may be capable of
autonomy... [as part] of the liberal and republican tradition." Sherry, supra note 9, at
158-59. Another commentator contends that "the jurisprudential republican revival,
operating as it does 'at the border between constitutional law and political theory' has
produced to date a 'watery' hybrid, which resembles liberalism almost as much as it
represents a new approach." Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American
Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REv. 983,992 (1990) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What
Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1733 (1989)).
Importantly Alain Finkielkraut suggests that it is possible to confuse self-congratulatory
egoism with human autonomy, which requires maturity as opposed to adolescence. See,
e.g., ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, THE DEFEAT OF THE MIND 122, 122-30 (Judith Friedlander
trans., 1995).
34. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
35. Peter L. Berger, Afterword to ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE, supra
note 33, at 114, 117.
36. Id. at 120.
37. Id. at 120.
38. Id. at 121.
2003]
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confronting and suppressing the forces of private dissent.39 Accordingly, the
public school system, often widely acclaimed as the bulwark of American
democracy, retains and accretes its power by stifling expression of difference.'
One observer, less committed to the dogmatism and fundamentalism that often
exemplifies American life, implies that increased school choice, including
vouchers and charter schools, may lead to both competition and diversity.4
Indeed, she states that the "three lines-between public and private, non-profit
and profit, secular and religious-are newly up for grabs in the contest of school
reform."42  She also contends, "Universally available inadequate schooling
[offers] a tragic sort of equality."43 It is far from obvious that those committed
to the dogmatism of the prevailing liberal order are receptive to these views.
Nowhere is such dogmatism more evident than in the debate about school choice
in general, and school vouchers in particular.
One perceptive supporter of educational choice prefers tax credits to
vouchers, because in "the long run, vouchers may not diminish the role of
government and politics in education."" Vouchers, apparently, are merely one
way and perhaps not the best way of structuring and improving school choice.
Nonetheless, the debate over vouchers likely anticipates the potential debate over
other and perhaps better school choice options. Vouchers are currently at issue
in several states, including Florida, 45 Illinois,46 Wisconsin,47 and Ohio. Public
39. ARONS, supra note 24, at vii.
40. ARONS, supra note 24, at vii.
41. Minow, supra note 22, at 1062-94.
42. Minow, supra note 22, at 1063. In other contexts, the "federal and state
governments have actually long worked through non-profit providers. Governments
enter into contracts engaging non-profits to provide specific services.... These patterns
are more pronounced now as direct governmental provision has diminished and as non-
profit providers, including religious providers, depend on increasing percentages of
public aid. By 1993, government sources provided 65 percent of the revenues of
Catholic Charities and 75 percent of the revenues of the Jewish Board of Family and
Children's Services." Minow, supra note 22, at 1063.
43. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 257
(1999).
44. Reed, supra note 17, at 7.
45. See, e.g., Robert Holland, Vouchers Motivate Florida Educators, SCHOOL
REFORM NEWS, June 2000 (published by the Heartland Institute, 19 South LaSalle St.,
Suite 903, Chicago, IL 60603), available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=l 0976.
46. See, e.g., George A. Clowes, State-Federal Conflict on Vouchers, SCHOOL
REFORM NEWS, Jan./Feb. 2001 (published by the Heartland Institute, 19 South LaSalle
St., Suite 903, Chicago, IL 60603), available at
http://www.heartland.org/archives/ia/janfebOl/education.htm.
47. George A. Clowes, WI Democrats Vote Again to Slash Vouchers, SCHOOL
REFORM NEWS, June 2002 (published by the Heartland Institute, 19 South LaSalle St.,
Suite 903, Chicago, IL 60603), available at
[Vol. 68
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policy arguments deployed either in favor of or against vouchers are likely to be
repackaged and assembled in favor of or against other forms of enhanced school
choice. However problematic vouchers may be, the voucher debate, and hence
the school choice debate, is often tainted and influenced by unreliable claims.
For example, one commentator contends that the Zelman4" holding is
contrary to the idea that a democracy has always had an unchallengeable "duty
to teach all its children,"49 evidently through a system of public education. That
claim is problematic, (1) because the current system of public education (as part
of the common public school approach) came to dominate the provision of
education more than 100 years after the founding of the United States,0 and (2)
because the notion that "democracy" has an obligation to teach all its children
unavoidably suggests subordination.' On the other hand, one voucher proponent
contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman has the "greatest potential
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=9282.
48. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
49. Mary McGrory, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Folly: The Bush
Administration and Supreme Court Do Their Worst, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July
6, 2002, at A 13. Other largely unsubstantiated arguments include the assertion that:
voucher plans harm public education because they take needed money away
from public schools; disproportionately benefit wealthy students because
vouchers cover only a fraction of the cost of private education; offer no real
assistance to those students whose families have the least information and
money; and raise the possibility of providing state funds to schools that may
discriminate on the basis of factors like race, religion, disability, and/or socio-
economic status.
Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money, and Schools: Voucher Programs
Impugn the Separation of Church and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 5 (1996). This
argument, aimed at unrestricted voucher plans as well as those in operation in Milwaukee
and Cleveland, fails to deal either directly or accurately with the concerns of African-
Americans and other outsider groups and ultimately reaches a questionable conclusion.
On the other hand, Thomas Sowell suggests, "One of the most hypocritical objections
made by opponents is that vouchers pay so little that they can only be used in religious
schools. If that is the critics' real concern, why don't they advocate raising the amount
of money per voucher?" Thomas Sowell, Court Helps Reject Phony Arguments on
School Vouchers, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 17, 2002, at 12A.
50. The one common school movement was itself part of an alleged educational
reform movement. The goals of this movement were to be achieved by politicizing the
educational system, encouraging the adoption of compulsory public education and
shifting responsibility for education from the family to the state. From the I 840s through
the next 100 years the common public school movement sought to institutionalize a
system of government-established, government-funded, and government-run schools
acceptable to the majority. Harry Hutchison, Private Schools: Let Competition Heat Up,
in EDUCATIONAL CHOICE FOR MICHIGAN 47,61 (Lawrence Reed& Harry Hutchison eds.,
1991).
51. For an argument in favor of such domination purportedly for the purpose of
creating responsible republicanism, see Sherry, supra note 9, at 156-72.
2003]
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for benefiting American Society." 2 Not only is it much too early to tell, but the
creation of vouchers has the potential to encourage government intrusion in the
form of regulation in what were otherwise truly private schools. This possibility
has the capacity to eviscerate the distinctiveness of private schools and enhance
government power at the expense of both diversity in educational approaches and
of meaningful community input into the provision of education, which remains
unfettered by the imprecatory regulations of the liberal state.
In the face of this squabble which is largely attached to "liberal principles,"
and in light of the possibility that "conditions for blacks and other people of color
[may] worsen,"" Richard Delgado echoes Reinhold Niebuhr's 1930s insight that
racism persists "because the self-interest of majority groups prevents a full
embrace of the racial outsider." 4 He notes that recently scholars of color on both
the left and what can be called the neoconservative right" "share deep
dissatisfaction with the moderate-liberal civil rights policies this nation has been
pursuing since the days of Brown v. Board of Education."6 Despite their
differences, they "have a vision of the search for racial justice, and law's role in
it, that differs sharply from the conventional one."" Patricia Williams, "a
Criticalist, writes that law teaches us not to know what we know-to ignore and
falsify our own lives. Similarly, conservatives such as [Stephen] Carter and
[Shelby] Steele write that law falsifies our experience by denying us agency-by
teaching us that we are weak, victimized, inferior, and must rely on preferences
and handouts to get ahead." 8 Notably and radically, "[b]oth groups reject white
idealism and generosity as reliable wellsprings for advancing the cause of black
justice."59 Instead, mobilization, disruption and the rejection of white altruism,
coupled with hard work and the creation of something more reliable than
goodwill form the basis of what can be called "independence" from, and a lack
of confidence in, liberal discourse."0 Both sets of writers "use stories, irony and
humor to puncture self-serving majoritarian myths"6 ' attached to the liberal order.
Hence, "both groups agree that racism [paternalism?] persists in our society, in
52. Sowell, supra note 49, at 12A.
53. Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing
About Race, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 1547, 1560 (1991).
54. Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 149, 151 (Michael McConnell et al. eds.,
2001).
55. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1548.
56. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1553-54.
57. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1554.
58. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1555.
59. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1556.
60. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1556-57.
61. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1557.
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the face of liberalism's optimistic claims of progress and forecasts of a rosy
future.
62
It is in that spirit that this Article deploys an outsider-premised-fairness
perspective, enriched by Critical Race Theory ("CRT") insights, reformist views
of disparate impact and other non-majoritarian observations to inspect the school
voucher debate. This Article challenges fundamental and often self-
congratulatory conceptions of neutrality (religious hostility?) associated with the
liberal state's centrally imposed conceptions of the First Amendment, which
some would either erect or sustain to thwart the subversive possibility of African-
American educational independence. Occasionally, the perspective of this essay
may even be intensified by conservative insights. Taken together, this analysis
breathes life into Niebuhr's much earlier claim that outsiders, "such as the
African-American, must 'develop both economic and political power to meet the
combination of political and economic power which confronts him."'63
Black Americans are among the nation's strongest supporters of vouchers
as a device to improve educational options" because, in addition to the plausible
educational improvements they desire, they, in contrast to many whites, are
apparently animated by "the deadly danger [of] raising children without the aid
of the tight moral cocoon that religions of genuine power can still offer."6" On
the other hand, since religious instruction in public schools failed to change
American attitudes toward slavery before the Civil War,66 it may be risky to
contend that religious instruction, even in private schools, is always a good thing.
Still, experiments with school vouchers, especially if widespread and unburdened
by government bureaucracy, have the capacity to diminish (at least at the margin)
the agglomerations of power necessary for maintaining the prevailing liberal
political order and its contribution to the sustained economic marginalization of
outsiders.67 Daniel Farber contends, "CRT prompts a recognition of the urgency
62. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1559.
63. Douglas, supra note 54, at 158.
64. See Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay
on Legal Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 54, at 25, 52.
65. Id. More broadly, "[r]eligious beliefs and practices helped link faith to action
not only for blacks but for white West Virginia coal miners, whose prayer meetings,
biblical interpretations, and sacred songs strengthened their bond in the struggle for better
working conditions. Similarly, Latin American organizers used religious symbols in
faith-based communities to interpret and legitimize political action." LANI GUINIER &
GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER,
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 81 (2002).
66. WARD M. MCAFEE, RELIGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL IN THE POLITICS OF THE 1870S, at 36-37 (1998) (Old abolitionist Gerrit Smith
recalled that in the early days of the crusade against slavery, he called on public-school
students to join the cause with little result.).
67. To take one example, consider minimum wage laws. See, e.g., Hutchison,
supra note 12, at 93-134.
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of America's racial problems and an uncompromising search for real solutions
rather than comforting stop-gaps. '8 Vouchers and school choice prompts us to
move beyond the rather stale dispute among the experts about how to reform
failing public schools, and to instead concentrate on a debate that places the
tangible concerns of African-Americans and other outsiders at the center of any
resolution of the dispute about how Americans should be educated in the future.
This Article will out of necessity be somewhat messy, characterized by
unavoidably overlapping analysis as a result of both the absence of clarity in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the complexity of racial stigma in our
society. I will neither explicate the meta-interpretative diversity associated with
Establishment Clause exegesis nor provide a convincing meta-ethic on school
vouchers. Although I am concerned about the exclusionary and subordinating
effects of the existing public school system, I take no definitive public policy
position in favor of school vouchers.69 I am, however, prepared to take a position
on both the terms of the school choice debate and the effects of rejecting
educational experimentations, which may benefit outsiders. Because "the causes
of poverty within the black community are both structural and behavioral,"7 and
because the available evidence provides an inferential connection between
education and poverty, I contend that the reigning legal and political theory as
embedded in, and as explicated by the constitutional jurisprudence of the Zelman
dissenters, and as exemplified by other commentators, fails to address adequately
racial disparity and neglects to consider adequately the victims of the current
public school hegemony. Hence, the legitimacy of much of the current
opposition to school vouchers remains indefensible from an outsider perspective.
This conclusion is energized less by the chasm between structuralists and
behaviorists (whether they are politically liberal or conservative)7 than by what
Cornel West calls "the most basic issue facing black America: the nihilistic
threat to its very existence.""2 His intuition specifies: "This threat is not simply
a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness .... It is
primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological
depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in black
America."73 Although victimhood may confer power, it may also vitiate the
68. Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 894 (1994).
69. For a brief but excellent summary of some of the arguments which support
school vouchers, see Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A
Defense of Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847 (1999). But see Marci A.
Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807
(1999).
70. GATES, JR. & WEST, supra note 16, at xiii.
71. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 11-20 (2001).
72. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 12-13.
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capacity for self-govemance.74 School choice and vouchers may provide an
opportunity for inner-city parents to address nihilism and victimhood responsibly
on terms that are less reliant on subordination to the prevailing majoritarian
norms, and more dependent on the possibly diverse answers that black Americans
and other outsiders wish to provide to the question of human meaning in a
postmodern, pluralist, and yet non-ideologically diverse world. Such an approach
may begin to redress the injustice of the current educational system.
An approach animated by any form of "justice"" must proceed against a
largely skeptical backdrop that includes unresolved debates over both the veracity
and basis of justice claims. While Socrates claimed that "justice was not a
human creation but had its origin in external reality,... Thrasymachus disagreed;
he insisted, 'Justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger."' 76 If
Thrasymachus' conception of justice is correct, the interest of outsider groups
will likely flounder amidst contemporary commitments to liberal faith and
"progressive" principles. Nevertheless, given the existing difficulties that
confront "Black America," the educational deficits within the inner cities of
America, and the intense and apparently growing support for vouchers among
blacks77 and other outsiders, it is a propitious time to interrogate the voucher
question from a perspective that is animated both by concern for the "future of
the race" and by the inference that dependence on liberal answers inexorably
contributes to the conclusion that "[r]ace, our most enduring problem, is likely
to remain, for now, as intractable as ever."7"
Part II of this Article develops what can be called an outsider-premised-
fairness methodology by combining CRT's culturally-informed-intent approach
to racial disadvantage with the reformist's version of the effects test as seasoned
by other non-majoritarian approaches, including public choice theory,79 to
74. Sherry, supra note 9, at 149.
75. If we take distributive justice as an example, Aristotle apparently said, "justice
is equality, as all men believe it to be." Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41,41-42 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). But is equally clear that he
like Plato and others before him believed that "a just distribution is in general an unequal
one." Id. Apparently what he meant by equality was some form of geometrical equality
or proportionality. Hence ajust, fair and equal distribution for persons of unequal worth
would have to be unequal. A complex and comprehensive conception ofjustice will not
be offered here.
76. Albert W. Alschuler, A Century of Skepticism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 54, at 94, 99.
77. See, e.g., Kurt L. Schmoke, Why School Vouchers Can Help Inner-City
Children, 20 THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CIVIC BULLETIN 1-5 (August 1999), available
at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_20.htm.
78. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1560.
79. James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of
Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 6
(James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) ("Public choice scholars seek to
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examine the terms of the vouchers from the perspective of African-Americans
and other outsider groups in the United States. Part III inspects what Martin
Loughlin identifies as the liberal order.8° This includes a brief inspection of the
historical evolution of the common public school and the concomitant creation
and exclusion of outsider groups, including Irish Catholics and African-
Americans, by dominating ideologies that may have been transmuted by time, yet
retain the power to subordinate. While this approach provides necessary
background for examining the Zelman decision and its related arguments, I also
explore the appeal of school choice to a group that seems particularly
disenfranchised: African-Americans. Undoubtedly, part of the appeal of school
choice, beyond the creation of choice itself, is the possibility of creating a
community with values and methodologies which may be distinct from those
inculcated within the dominant (homogeneous?) school system.8 While
experimentation is often thwarted by those committed to public school
orthodoxy, school choice experimentation may allow outsiders to address
peculiar problems in distinctive and hopeful ways. 2 Lastly, I examine the
defense of public schools, the professed concern for strife, and the attempt to
silence outsiders and others by branding school choice supporters as racist. This
inspection provides a basis with which to challenge both the Court and
contemporary commentary from the perspective of outsiders.
Part IV applies conventional analyses to inspect the Supreme Court's
arguments for and against vouchers. The terns of the voucher debate apparently
implicate the Establishment Clause in the clash between consistency and
inconsistency in constitutional adjudication, the need for neutrality, the
possibility of coercion and the stated need to save private religion from
corruption by public monies. Although there is clearly a dispute between the
dissenters and the majority of the Court, there is some agreement (however
unjustifiable) on the question of whether public education should be reified as a
necessary building block for democracy. Part V directly applies outsider-
premised-fairness analysis to question various organizing themes that are
embedded in the Court's approach to the Establishment Clause. I contend that
explain how political processes actually work. They do not view government as some
organic entity that always makes decisions in the public interest.").
80. LOUGHLIN, supra note 1, at 5.
81. For an examination of this possibility, see ARONS, supra note 24, at 178-85,
192. See also Sharon Keller, Something to Lose: The Black Community's Hard Choices
About Educational Choice, 24 J. LEGiS. 67 (1998); Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans
Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization ofRace
and Public Education, 78 IowA L. REV. 813 (1993).
82. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a
New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375, 2377 (1997) (commenting on the attempt to set up
male academies to help at-risk black males). Such experimentation is more likely to find
a receptive opportunity within the context of private education.
[Vol. 68
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/2
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
liberal political theory, the ruling orthodoxy on matters of social justice and the
First Amendment, "gives insufficient weight to history-especially to the
enduring and deeply rooted racial disparity in life chances characteristic of
American society,"83 and therefore unjustifiably weighs Establishment Clause
jurisprudence against outsiders. I argue, accordingly, that the voucher dispute
must be properly situated to place the interests of outsiders at the core, not the
periphery, of the debate.
II. DEVELOPING AN OUTSIDER-PREMISED-FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE
Cass Sunstein contends that many of the most important clauses of the
Constitution, despite their disparate historical roots, are united by a common
theme: "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than
another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political
power to obtain what they want."84 Evidently, these underlying evils, called
"naked preferences," are largely ruled out by the Constitution.85 Assuming the
correctness of this view, how then does the United States, and more particularly,
how does the Supreme Court, deal with the possibility that government power
and resources will be captured by factions through indirect but no less powerful
forms of subordination that may be fueled by either conscious or unconscious
racism? While there are doubtlessly several answers, an outsider-premised-
fairness methodology provides a helpful response. The United States has
"progressed" from "separate-and-unequal," to "separate-but-equal" to Brown v.
Board ofEducation,6. which apparently terminated three and a half centuries of
de jure and de aequitate racial segregation and discrimination and has now
commenced an era of formal equal opportunity. Formal equal opportunity
("FEO") evidently "requires that all Americans, regardless of race or color, are
to have equal legal status.... [and thus] envisions a society in which the races
are symmetrically situated." 8 Apparently, this doctrine presumes that there are
no outsiders and that pre-existing disparities are unlikely to affect either the
social or economic relations of groups in the future. On the other hand, "CRT
favors an asymmetrical ideal of racial equality which rejects race-blindness in
favor of an'empowerment' model that permits taking affirmative steps to achieve
83. LOURY, supra note 14, at 7.
84. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689 (1984).
85. Id. at 1689-90.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REv.
787, 792-795 (1994).
88. Id. at 795.
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a level playing field" 9 for individuals and groups who have historically been
subordinated and excluded from full participation in what America has to offer.
Critical Race theorists "endorse extensive sociolegal tradeoffs favoring people
of color, including deployment of a culturally informed intent test."90 When it
inspects "seemingly neutral areas of law, CRT is thus able to find 'concepts of
"race" and racism always already there."' 9 CRT is animated by the belief that
"liberalism" and white "idealism" may be rather limp instruments for advancing
the cause of African-American justice.92 In fact, liberalism and idealism may
indirectly precludejustice. To be sure, "CRT has not abandoned the fundamental
political goal of traditional civil rights scholarship: the liberation of people of
color from racial subordination."93 In accordance with that goal, CRT assumes
that "America's cultural identity, values, and meanings cannot be separated from
its past and present social relations of domination and power."' In effect, it
applies public choice theory's suspicion that people are the same when they act
publicly and privately 9 -that is, people are motivated by self-interest which
yearns to exclude and subordinate others. This yearning may be animated by
either a craving for enhanced status production96 or by pure economic or political
self-interest. Thus, CRT, like public choice scholarship, is inherently suspicious
of majority and majoritarian assumptions and claims, especially when attached
to dominant programs or policies. CRT deploys an analysis that proceeds from
an outsider perspective that is historically, sociologically and culturally informed.
While so-called classical-liberal reformists ("reformists") "believe in the
principle of Formal Equality of Opportunity [] to combat racial discrimination
... both Critical Race theorists ("race crits") and classical-liberal reformists
89. Id. at 790; see also Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 893, 898 (1995) (contending that CRT is committed to the struggle
against racism, "particularly as institutionalized in and by law").
90. Hutchison, supra note 12, at 99.
91. Hutchison, supra note 12, at 94; see also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 750 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 53, at 1547-60.
93. Harris, supra note 91, at 750.
94. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music:
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2129, 2132 (1992).
95. Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 7; see also Richard L. Stroup, Political
Behavior, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 45, 45 (David R. Henderson
ed., 1993) ("The fact of scarcity, which exists everywhere, guarantees that people will
compete for resources. Markets are one way to organize and channel this competition.
Politics is another. People use both markets and politics to get resources allocated to the
ends they favor.").
96. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1083-84 (1995).
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... demand more than FEO to deal with racism."97 Race crits concede that FEO
reacts well to "the most obvious and grotesque forms of racism, whereas most
forms of racism are deeply embedded in the framework of our society.""8 The
analysis, therefore, must go further by creating a culturally informed standard of
intent, because "[i]t is not simply supremacist attitudes (substantive) but it is also
individual or institutionalized behavior (procedural) that have the effect of
subordinating persons of color"99 to the prevailing racial hegemony. Reformists,
on the other hand, concentrate on an examination of the effects of allegedly racist
laws and policies and not simply asserted intent (neutral or otherwise) in order
to find discrimination.'0 0 When used in conjunction with each other, these two
modes of analysis, along with occasional public choice views, provide an
insightful framework for assessing whether school vouchers can plausibly be
supported from an outsider-premised-faimess perspective,'0 ' and whether
resistance to vouchers can be seen as defensible given the contemporary terms
of the debate.
First, this examination proceeds from a viewpoint that calls for an
investigation of sociolegal insights derived from economics, history, culture and
analogous international patterns to assess the level of supremacist attitudes and
subordinating behavior attached to the common public school.'0 2  This
examination is driven to ascertain whether public schools can be seen as a truly
egalitarian, neutral device that unifies the country from the vantage point of
African-Americans and other outsiders, or whether it is attached either directly
or indirectly to racist ideology or conscious or unconscious racial motivation.0 3
Second, consistent with the view that greater deference should be given to the
concerns of minorities,0 4 evidence that the proponents of public schools (judicial
or otherwise) have knowledge or should have knowledge of any discriminatory
effects of the common public school would effectively challenge the asserted
neutrality and fundamentalism of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
associated commentary as a barrier to school choice experimentation.
Effectively, this approach provides an interpretative critique' 5 of widely accepted
97. Hutchison, supra note 12, at 99.
98. Brooks & Newborn, supra note 87, at 798.
99. Hutchison, supra note 12, at 99 (citing Brooks & Newborn, supra note 87, at
798).
100. Hutchison, supra note 12, at 99.
101. For an argument that fairness to outsider groups should constitute the central
concern of civil rights policy, see Brooks & Newborn, supra note 87, at 838.
102. For an introduction to this approach in the context of minimum wages, see
Hutchison, supra note 12, at 102-03.
103. For a discussion of this approach, see Lawrence, supra note 7, at 322.
104. See Hutchison, supra note 12, at 102-03.
105. For an introduction to an interpretivist approach to the determination of
cultural meaning, see Lawrence, supra note 7, at 358-62.
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Establishment Clause principles, including the overriding principle of "complete
official neutrality,""1 6 as well as various operational principles"0 7 and subsidiary
doctrines0 8 that can be deployed, when and if the courts are so inclined, 0 9 to
thwart programs and policies that attempt to place the interest of outsiders at the
center of this ongoing debate. This approach challenges the social vision that
reinforces and contributes, either collectively or individually, to the social,
political and economic enervation of people of color by "liberal" institutions"0
such as the common public school, while concurrently scrutinizing the terms of
the debate.
The deployment of this methodology does not suggest that prevailing views,
however connected to fundamentalism, are evil or always erroneous,"' or for that
matter that those CRT views and viewpoints, which are driven by identity and
difference (especially mandatory ones) are inevitably correct." 2 That, after all,
would be an escape into a new and different kind of fundamentalism. CRT,
reformist, and other non-majoritarian views are crucial because they directly
dispute prevailing views that may otherwise simply be sealed off from
"discordant feedback from reality."''' CRT and reformist views are one tool,
among many, for examining the terms of the debate over school vouchers while
remaining animated by the future of the race.
106. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1338-42.
107. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1343-51. The operational principles include, among
other things, the Lemon Test, the "Religious Purpose" Principle, the "Advancing
Religion" Principle, and the "Excessive Entanglement" Principle. Sedler, supra note 6,
at 1343-51.
108. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1351-59.
109. See Jesse H. Choper, The Unpredictability of the Supreme Court's Doctrine
in Establishment Clause Cases, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1439, 1440 (1997) (When the
Supreme Court does not "like a result to which a principled analysis leads, they simply
decline to reach it.").
110. For an excellent perspective on this possibility, see Delgado, supra note 53,
at 1553-59. Patricia Williams "tells of being taught ... to combat raw power with
images of powerlessness," while Shelby Steele suggests when victims bind themselves
to victimization, they may become dependent on social means for change, and he urges
us to break this dependency. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1558.
111. SOWELL, supra note 21, at 1.
112. For a cautionary view on the limits of difference in an American venue, see
JEAN BETHKE ELsHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 65-90 (1995). "[T]he language of
opposition now appears as a cascading series of manifestos that tell us we cannot live
together, we cannot work together.., we are not Americans who have something in
common." Id. at xii; see also Harry Hutchison, From Bujumbura to Mogadishu: Ethnic
Solidarity, African Reality, American Implications, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON.
141 (1997) (reviewing KEITH B. RICHBURG, OUT OF AMERICA: A BLACK MAN
CONFRONTS AFRICA (1997)).
113. SOWELL, supra note 21, at 1.
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IIl. THE LIBERAL ORDER, THE COMMON PUBLIC SCHOOL AND THE
SUBVERSIVE POWER OF ALTERNATIVES
Stephen Arons rightly contends that "so long as the law requires that
contests for control of school socialization be decided by political majorities,
there will always be dissenters whose beliefs and world views have been banned
from the schools in violation of the Constitution."' 4 Understanding the liberal
order and its tentacles in the common public school movement provides a useful
prism through which to examine the terms of the Zelman Court's decision and
holding. What the liberal order or theory is, and what its constitutive elements
consist of, are surely open to debate." 5 It is possibly nothing more than a
seductive movement that captures "leaders as acolytes enthralled by their own
... enslavement"" 6 to talismanic rhetoric that presumes the "coherence... of
public culture in a liberal democratic community.'' 117 Evidently, "liberalism is
associated with a particular way of life... [and] goes to great lengths... to hide
the fact that it imposes a specific moral outlook on its citizens.""' One
commentator observes:
Liberal theory of course, is a theory; it need not be psychologically
accurate; it need not deal with people as they are; it can consider
people as they should be. So when [commentators] ... [suggest] that
liberalism[] should set out to combat illiberal religions, we should take
[them] quite seriously. [They are] uninterested in constructing the state
for the benefit of the people. [They] would rather construct the people
for the benefit of the state. That is the reason that liberal theory
focuses so heavily on public education.'"
114. ARONS, supra note 24, at 2. One burgeoning response is the exponential
growth of homeschooling which began sometime around fifty to sixty years ago as a
liberal, not a conservative, alternative to the public school. Homeschooling is apparently
growing at about fifteen to twenty percent per year and has "traditionally provided havens
for those who dissent from the public school curriculum." Patricia M. Lines,
Homeschooling Comes ofAge, 140 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 74, 75 (2000).
115. See supra Part 1.
116. MARVA J. DAWN, POWERS, WEAKNESS, AND THE TABERNACLING OF GOD 6
(2001).
117. Bernard Yack, Liberalism Without Illusions: An Introduction to Judith
Shidar's Political Thought, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSION: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL
THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 1, 3 (1996).
118. This rhetoric enforces and informs liberal morality. See, e.g., Thomas F.
Powers, The Transformation of Liberalism, 1964-2001, 145 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 59,
69 (2001).
119. Carter, supra note 64, at 25; see also JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL
SOCIETY 348 (John Wilkinson trans., 1964) (Evidently in such an increasinglytotalitarian
world, public education does not aim to educate for the benefit of the child, but aims to
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While such subordinating views are not limited to the United States, 2 °
judges and courts committed to this perspective may be animated by the desire
to create an indivisibly homogenous "doctrine that protects public education from
private power in much the same way that it presently separates church and
state."'' While Gerrit Smith, the old abolitionist, argued that "[d]ividing the task
of educating the nation's youth among schools teaching different creeds and
ideologies posed no threat... to the health of the republic,"'22 contemporary
America has largely surrendered to the pull of centralizing public school
ideologies. Bruce Ackerman, who defends neutrality among competing visions
of the good life, exemplifies this centralizing tendency. He states: "We have no
right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners.... [Hence, a]
system of liberal education provides children with a sense of the very different
lives that could be theirs-so that, as they approach maturity, they have the
cultural materials available to build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of
the good."' 23 That is an inherently unreliable claim, (1) because, exactly like
political and judicial neutrality, "educational neutrality is [not] possible,"'24 and
(2) because this theory contains an implicit, if not explicit, commitment to one
conception (both procedurally and substantively) of the good. Critical Race
Theory has always implied, and some republicans now concede, "The liberal
values of neutrality, tolerance, and rationality are themselves non-neutral: other
value systems may be based on believing in a 'faith that is innocent of
alternatives' rather than adherence to particular views that are seen as 'subjective,
form the child as an instrument of society. Public schools then become instruments of
adaptation and conformity. "What looks like the apex of humanism is in fact the pinnacle
of human submission: children are educated to become precisely what society expects
of them.").
120. For example, Egerton Ryerson as superintendent of schools for Upper Canada
(now Ontario) for almost three decades commencing in the 1840s "did more to advance
the government take-over of education than any other Canadian .... The motivation
behind [his] ... activity was his profound belief that his fellow citizens, like many errant
sheep, were incapable of looking after themselves and needed to be herded and watched
over by a vigilant government .... Rather than trying to make the state serve the will of
the people, Ryerson aimed to convince the people to follow the will of the state.
'Government operates on mind' . . . as 'a minister of God' showering its blessings on its
subjects." Andrew J. Coulson, Market Education and the Public Good, in CAN THE
MARKET SAVE OUR SCHOOLS?, at 53, 54-55 (Claudia R. Hepburn ed., 2001), available
at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=270.
121. James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not
Enough, 34 AKRON L. REv. 383, 397 (2000).
122. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37.
123. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139 (1980)
(cited in Sherry, supra note 9, at 157).
124. Sherry, supra note 9, at 158.
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contestable matters of opinion.""' 125 "Upon reflection, th[e] failure [of liberal
neutrality] should not be surprising.... There is no neutral vantage point that can
permit the theorist or judge to transcend . . . competing positions."'126
Nevertheless, liberalism continues to be unwilling to accommodate itself to the
possibility that valid systems of meaning exist outside of the narrow, fractured
cocoon of various versions of purported neutrality.'27 What then is a public
education? How has it been made to operate consistently with liberal values in
the face of a variety of threats to its philosophical and practical dominance? How
are liberal values that often focus on human autonomy to be defended in a post-
modem, post-Enlightenment world comprised of rival, even anti-foundational
conceptions of human meaning? To set the stage, a brief inspection of the
historical evolution of the common public school and its capacity to create
outsiders is in order.
A. The Historical Evolution of the Common Public School
Writing in 1960, historian Bernard Bailyn "argued that American
educational historiography was sadly deficient. . . . The typical history of
education course found in universities... had become a 'form of initiation' ...
to illustrate the purportedly glorious achievements of public schools."'28 Instead
of being a humanitarian reform, "[t]he battle for tax-supported compulsory
schooling was a recurring story of political power, social control, and the growth
of a powerful, unresponsive bureaucracy.... [consumed by] various social goals
. . . such as 'Americanizing' immigrants, teaching a proper respect for
government, and inculcating the values of the dominant class."' 29
The defenders of the common public school approach have, therefore, failed
to appreciate adequately that "[e]ach generation of Americans, from the very first
handful in the seventeenth century to the hundreds of millions in the twentieth
century, has sought to create a social order in which equity and justice, as they
understood it, would prevail."'30 The vigor of the "Pilgrims in Massachusetts and
the settlers in Virginia were matched . . . by the ceaseless struggles of the
125. Sherry, supra note 9, at 158 (quoting Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a
Circle that Shut Me Out ": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARV. L. REv. 581, 587 n.26 (1993)).
126. J. JUDD OWEN, RELIGION AND THE DEMISE OF LIBERAL RATIONALISM: THE
FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 7 (2001).
127. Carter, supra note 64, at 53.
128. George H. Smith, Nineteenth-Century Opponents of State Education:
Prophets of Modern Revisionism, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 109, 109 (Robert B.
Everhart ed., 1982).
129. Id. at 109-10.
130. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 3-4 (1976).
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Jeffersonians and Jacksonians and of the sectionalists and unionists of the
nineteenth century."'' Indeed, "[e]ach individual and each group brought to this
quest the varied backgrounds and experiences that defined their own objectives
and fostered differences in methods as well as goals."'32 This diversity led,
inevitably, to either private schooling or locally controlled public schools.33
without the necessity of either state or federal government control and without
the need to make the people follow the will of the state. Although the specter of
privatization 3' is often raised against school choice and vouchers, it is plain that
private, not public schools, are the historical norm in the United States.'35
The founding of the republic was arguably consistent with Lockean values.
Similarly, America's initial approach to education was largely consistent with
Locke's version, which was principally "nonphilosophic, directed not toward
contemplation and questioning but toward a more reliable transmission of family
values, including the family property."' 3 6 "By 1720, Boston had more private
schools than taxpayer-financed ones, and by the close of the American
Revolution, many Massachusetts towns had no tax-funded schools at all."' 3 7
Persuasive evidence suggests that "most parents preferred private schools to the
government ones."' 38 In general, "[w]herever colonial governments showed an
interest in promoting schools, private schools were also eligible for government
funding. There was no discrimination against schools that provided a religious
education."' 3 9 "At the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, there were
virtually no state schools. In the early years of the Republic, public support for
education generally took the form of grants to private schools, many of which
were religious in nature."'40 What was classified as public education (whether
privately run or not) "began as an extension of the home, rather than a dramatic
131. Id. at4.
132. Id.
133. Confusingly, the term "public school" was often used with reference to
private, even religious schools. See, e.g., LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE
NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 6-7 (1987).
134. See William D. Anderson, Note, Religious Groups in the Educational
Marketplace: Applying the Establishment Clause to School Privatization Programs, 82
GEO. L.J. 1869 (1994).
135. This approach evidently echoed the Voluntaryists' and dissenters' position
that began in England by "defenders of individual rights and foes of oppressive
government.... Education [they concluded] is best promoted by freedom." Smith, supra
note 128, at 119-20.
136. Diana Schaub, Can Liberal Education Survive Liberal Democracy, 147 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 45, 48 (2002).
137. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 6.
138. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 6.
139. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 6.
140. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cleveland City Council Woman Fannie Lewis at 7,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
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separation from it."'' "Between 1800 and 1830, New York provided public
funds to Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Methodist, Quaker, Dutch Reformed,
Baptist, Lutheran, and Jewish schools, to an African Free School, and to the 'Free
School Society,' a nonsectarian charitable school that was the forerunner of the
public school system."'' 42
While common public schools did not become widespread until the 1850s,
the first common public school was built well before the nineteenth century "in
the Puritan commonwealth of Massachusetts to inculcate the Calvinist Puritan
religion in the colony's young."'' 43 However, "[a]s the Puritans' commonwealth
acceded to the development of trade and the influx of other religious sects,
enforcement of the Massachusetts school laws grew lax, and private schools soon
sprang up to teach the more practical commercial subjects."'" Evidently,
"[p]rivate education was widely demanded in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries in Great Britain and America."'' 4' Although many contemporary
observers oppose the possibility that value inculcation is a matter that is best left
up to parents, who exercise educational choices on behalf of their children,'46
American history implies that the "private supply of education was highly
responsive to... demand, with the consequence that large numbers of children
from all classes of society received several years of education."' 47 Private
education was also "quite successful. Literacy in the North rose from 75 percent
to between 91 and 97 percent between 1800 and 1840, the years prior to
compulsory schooling and governmental provision and operation of
education.'
48
"The American public school emerged in the early nineteenth century amid
significant social and economic changes."'' 49 While the government takeover of
education gathered momentum during the 1830s and 1840s' as part of a move
to entrench anti-Catholic bigotry,'' it "did little to increase educational access
141. Schaub, supra note 136, at 49.
142. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 140, at 7-8.
143. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 5.
144. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 6.
145. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting Barry W. Poulson, Education and the
Family During the Industrial Revolution, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE 138
(Joseph R. Peden & Fred R. Glahe eds., 1986)).
146. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 9, at 160-61.
147. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting Poulson, supra note 145, at 168).
148. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 7. Boston became the first American city to have
a completely government-financed school system from the primary to the secondary level
in 1818. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 7-8.
149. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 9.
150. See, e.g., Brouillette, supra note 8, at 9-10.
151. See, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY,
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for children. Rather, it simply shifted the responsibility of education from the
family to the state."' 2  It prepared the circumstances for the takeover of
educational curricula by cultural elites. "Ever since its inception, the public
school system has represented a [potential] government monopoly over mass
education and therefore represents education from a particular perspective.""'
Members of the dominant hierarchy, whether they constitute a numerical majority
or not, "have the power to impose.., assumptions and norms on others and to
call those assumptions and norms neutral. But that power alone does not make
them so.""' It is accordingly appropriate to consider whether and how the
government school movement creates racial or other outsiders either through
direct exclusion or through other forms of suppression and degradation.
B. Creating Outsiders
Before I scrutinize the capacity and tendency of public schools to create
outsiders, it is important to qualify this discussion by noting that we have never
had truly public education in the United States.' It is true that "[w]e have
education of all sorts, but none of it is public, at least if you mean by 'public' that
ordinary people have access to the institutions, as in the case of the library, the
museum, the streets, [and] the courts."'" 6 What currently exists as a form of
publicly funded education in America is a system where people buy their way
into a system.' "We have our voucher: it's called the deed to our house, and
we buy our way in to a good school."' 8  "The poor, by contrast, have
conscription. They are sent off to a school not of their choosing but according
to their address."159
With that proviso, it is useful to examine two rather distinct groups who
have been disadvantaged by the common public school and its accompanying
ideology: Irish Catholic Americans and African-Americans. Despite their
differences, the American government school movement experienced persistent
difficulty in either educating or respecting both groups.
Horace Mann, as president of the State Senate in Massachusetts, "was
instrumental in establishing the Massachusetts Board of Education in 1837....
152. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
153. James Davison Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern
Pluralism, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE, supra note 33, at 54, 69.
154. W. Burlette Carter, What's Love Got To Do with It? Race Relations and the
Second Great Commandment, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 54, at 133, 147.
155. John E. Coons et al., The Pro-Voucher Left and the Pro-Equity Right, 572
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[and served] as the board's first secretary ... until 1848. ' ' 160 Evidently, he
succeeded because he offered a form of nonsectarianism (Protestantism),' 61
which he adroitly utilized to raise fears of sectarianism in others.'62
Correspondingly, John Blaine, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
leading Protestant reactionary during the nineteenth century, led a malicious and
cynical effort to further his political career at the expense of Catholic
immigrants. 163 This effort took the form of an attempt "to amend the Constitution
to prohibit aid to 'sectarian' schools (while affirming the practice of Bible
reading in the 'public' schools). . . . [M]any States adopted 'little Blaine
amendments'. . . [which] remained an effective bar to aid to private schooling in
most States."' 64 The generalized Protestant character of the common public
schools was enough to unify most Protestants in support of government
schooling. This "unity" was "bolstered in part by Protestants' reaction to
increased Catholic immigration and the attempt by Catholics to gain tax support
for their parochial schools."'165 "[S]ome believed that little could be done to
'salvage adult immigrants, irretrievably indolent and immoral as they allegedly
were,' [but] that their children 'could ostensibly be saved from the twin ailments
of Irish birth and Catholic faith by the "great remedy" of Protestant public
schooling.'"166 While the so-called "common schools of the eighteenth century
were... [local] community schools in the sense that they took on the doctrinal
coloration of the communities which supported them,... [the] nineteenth century
... developed to produce a different kind of 'common school' [as part of the
surging centralized conception of state run schools] .... [As American Catholics
noted during the nineteenth century,] 'public schools appeared to be increasingly
neutral against Roman Catholicism."1 67 Apparently, Irish Catholics and others
were to be reclaimed from their imaginary "deficiencies" by a process of
superordinate homogenization that precluded real educational choice.
The education available to America's blacks during the colonial and pre-
Civil War era failed to live up to South Africa's scrawny standards. 68 While the
South African government established government authorized and supported
160. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 9.
161. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
162. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
163. Marvin Olasky, Breaking Through Blaine's Roadblock, WORLD MAGAZINE,
Aug. 24, 2002, at 14-17.
164. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 140, at 9.
165. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
166. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET
EDUCATION: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY 75 (1999)).
167. ANDREW M. GREELEY & PETER H. RoSSi, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC
AMERICANS 2-3 (1966).
168. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 259 (1981).
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institutions, which were evidently open on a nondiscriminatory basis, American
blacks were largely excluded from white-supported educational institutions
(especially publicly funded ones).'69 The American version of the common
public school system continued to reify the subordination of blacks through
racially dis-integrated schools, if any education was allowed at all, 70 and through
a public education that "is still inferior in the majority of cases to that received
by [w]hites."'' Within the educational arena, educational reformers followed the
grim lead of Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann and other reformers on racial
questions. Jefferson, "[w]hen musing on the future of Africans in this country,
... expressed the view that blacks should be free, but he was certain that 'the two
races, equally free, cannot live in the same government' . . . [and] that blacks
•.. are 'inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind."" 72
Similarly, Mann, "an acknowledged leader in the common public school
movement, accepted racial segregation in education and admonished educators
who spoke out publicly"'73 against segregation. No doubt these views are
consistent with the prevailing majoritarian and superordinate position of the time,
and may contribute to superordination'74 in the future. One observer notes:
[T]he idea of a common school education in the United States was
conceived and promoted for white children who, presumably, would
undergo a leavening experience that would give them a sense of
equality.... Black children, however, were denied such an opportunity
because it was assumed that they were incapable of benefiting from
such an experience and because white society had defined for them an
inferior role in which education was really not necessary anyway.
169. Id. The situation for blacks deteriorated sharply once the British took over
from the Dutch. Id.
170. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 130, at 78-79; see also FREDRICKSON, supra
note 168, at 274-75 (In one state, for example, "the average white child of school age
received twelve times as much from the school fund as the average [black] child.").
171. Coulson, supra note 120, at 69.
172. Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 394-95 (1990); see also FRANKLIN, supra note
130, at 15 (While "Jefferson insisted he was strongly anti-slavery, his antipathy toward
the institution never took him to the point of freeing his own slaves or of using his
enormous prestige to oppose slavery unequivocally in word or deed.").
173. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 62.
174. One observer notes that "societies sort out their social groups into
superordinate and subordinate positions based on cultural, political, and economic
characteristics . . . . 'superordinate' [signifies] 'that collectivity within a society which
has preeminent authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of the controlling
value system, and as prime allocators of rewards in the society."' Thomas J. LaBelle, A
Comparative and International Perspective on the Prospects for Family and Community
Control of Schooling, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY, supra note 128, at 275, 276.
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Thus, they were officially denied every opportunity for an education
in the slave states, while in the free states they were largely excluded
from the schools.'
This mesmerizing devotion to hierarchy and exclusion compelled some
states to intervene to preclude independent private schools from educating black
pupils. '76 Plessy v. Ferguson' predictably strengthened the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which made its initial "appearance in a pre-Civil war decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court,"'7 where the court sustained the exclusion of a
black child from the elementary school nearest to her residence because it was
an all-white school. ' Other than in New Orleans, racial co-education was never
really tried in the southern part of the United States 8 ' until after 1954, as "the
Radical [post-Reconstruction] regimes [that] established the South's first
authentic public education systems... were too eager to win support for any kind
of public schooling ... to jeopardize the effort by enforcing integration and
arousing the bogey of 'social equality.' It is probable that contemporary
public schools continue to contribute to this bleak pattern of exclusion and state
sanctioned separation and therefore pose a threat to full, fair and free educational
opportunities for diverse groups of outsiders today. This riveting pattern is
neither surprising nor unique to the United States. 8
2
Conversely, private schools "have become vastly more integrated during the
past four decades, and, according to recent research, now offer a more genuinely
integrated environment than do public schools."' 83 Furthermore, when urban
private schools are compared to public schools serving the same low-income
minority student population, they "spend far less per student than public schools,
are better maintained, [are] safer, enjoy superior classroom discipline, and raise
175. FRANKLIN, supra note 130, at 78-79.
176. FRANKLIN, supra note 130, at 53-54.
177. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
178. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (3d ed. 1977).
179. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1 Cush 1849); see also DERRICK A.
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 155-63 (4th ed. 2000).
180. FREDRICKSON, supra note 168, at 260.
181. FREDRICKSON, supra note 168, at 260.
182. LaBelle, supra note 174, at 280-82 (reviewing the comparative evidence of
Pre-Mandela South Africa, Great Britain and the United States).
183. Coulson, supra note 120, at 69. Voluntary seating arrangement in the school
lunchroom may be an important indicator of school integration. Coulson, supra note
120, at 69-70. "Students in private (particularlyreligious) schools were much more likely
to chose lunch partners of other races than were students in public schools." Coulson,
supra note 120, at 69-70. On the possible effect of desegregation on the academic
achievement of black children, see Robert A. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken
v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1693, 1717-19 (1987).
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student achievement above the level achieved in government schools."' 4 In sum,
not only are public schools poor educational performers in an urban setting, not
only do they have a disproportionately adverse effect on blacks and other
outsiders, they also apparently continue to hinder the full and truly voluntary
integration of blacks within urban school districts.
Stigmatization consists of forcing the injured individuals (African-
Americans) to wear a badge or symbol that degrades them in the eyes of
society"'-separation and segregation may be such a symbol. 6 Segregation
may simply be a cultural stereotype that produces unconscious racism." 7
Nonetheless, despite the fact that state sponsored and enforced segregation has
been an instrument of humiliation both within and outside of state sponsored
schooling, it may be difficult to prove that either integration or integrationism has
always been a blessing for people of color.' 8 Even though not all African-
Americans acknowledge Stanley Crouch's admonition that "we can never forget
that our fate as Americans is, finally, collective, and that we fail our mission as
a democratic nation whenever we submit to any sort of segregation that would
remake the rules,"'8 9 and in spite of the fact that full integration may not be
mandated by the Constitution, parents and students should be free to choose this
option unimpeded by the modus operandi of the current public school monopoly.
The history of Irish Catholic and African-American exclusion confirms an
essential CRT and reformist deduction: the importance of race and society's
placement of groups and individuals in particular racial categories for the
purposes of degradation, subordination and mandatory homogenization. Because
race and the social construction of race likely retain explanatory power as either
a quintessential or background component ofjudicial and political decisions, we
should be deeply suspicious of efforts to frame the voucher debate solely or
largely on First Amendment or other related grounds. While a full resolution of
the debate about the semiotics of race exceeds the scope of this essay, one
notable Irish-Hispanic scholar suggests that race ostensibly refers to a "group
of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant
184. Coulson, supra note 120, at 69.
185. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 349-53.
186. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 350.
187. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 343.
188. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice:
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1401 (1993); see
also Barnes, supra note 82, at 2385 (One reason for African-American ambivalence
about integration lies in the fact that racial isolation is primarily seen as harmful only for
minorities as opposed to all students.). In addition, Barnes argues that shipping black
children to predominantly white environments has often proven detrimental to the well-
being of African-Americans. Barnes, supra note 82, at 2389; see also BELL, supra note
179, at 155-99.
189. STANLEY CROUCH, THE ALL-AMERICAN SKIN GAME, OR, THE DECOY OF RACE:
THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT, 1990-1994, at 44 (1995).
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elements of their morphology and/or ancestry.""19 America's experience with
Irish-Americans, African-Americans and other outsider groups.9' demonstrates
that "[r]ace may be America's single most confounding problem, but the
confounding problem of race is that few people seem to know what race is. '"192
Suffice it to say, racial groups are comprised of individuals who share certain
publicly observable traits and may also be socially connected with other groups
and individuals.'93 Racial classifications are not simply physical or biological
concepts-"what is 'essential' here is that these physical traits [and in the case
of the Irish, religious traits] are taken to signify something of import within an
historical context."'94 In any case, when a substantial overlap exists between
groups that share observable traits and others who are socially connected, then
substantial investment in status production, including the subordination of other
groups through inferior education and other devices, is likely to occur. 95 The
development and preservation of racial categories enhances the status of groups
that are associated with, or that can be seen as part of, the majority.'96 Raising
the status of outsider groups through improved education, or by allowing
outsiders a role in eliminating the racial separation that generally occurs in public
schools, may constitute a threat to status-oriented majoritarian or elite groups.
This threat provides an often-undisclosed basis for opposing experiments which
may provide opportunities for lower-status groups to enhance their economic and
social position. Law may have a role in preventing the loss of status by some
groups by reinforcing the racial subordination of others,' 97 thus affirming the
intriguing possibility that race must be seen as a political category and a basis
for action. 9"
Beyond the status question, many of the waterless claims made in support
of the public education system and against vouchers or other forms of school
choice unconsciously neglect or deliberately distort disturbing facts that are
190. Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994).
191. For a discussion of images of outsiders, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 217, 218
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
192. L6pez, supra note 190, at 5-6.
193. McAdams, supra note 96, at 1084.
194. LOURY, supra note 14, at 21.
195. McAdams, supra note 96, at 1084.
196. It may also explain the desire of immigrants who did not consider themselves
white in their native countries to choose to be labeled white in the United States. See,
e.g., Solomon Moore & Robin Fields, In Identifying Themselves, Immigrants Change the
Face of Whiteness, THE DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 10, 2002, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2002/census/0208/1 0/census-558702.htm.
197. L6pez, supra note 190, at 3.
198. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 65, at 65.
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related either directly or tangentially to the absence of a viable education system
within largely black communities. Ethnic groups with above-average levels of
education-Jews, Chinese, Japanese-also have higher-quality education and are
thus disproportionately represented in the more selective colleges, and specialize
in more demanding and higher paying disciplines. Groups with below-average
levels of education-blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans--experience lower
quality education and tend to be more poorly represented in better paying
occupations. 99 While one observer challenges the claim that there is necessarily
a direct connection between income and education, °0 he concedes that since the
era of "affirmative action," black males with less than twelve years of schooling
and less than six years of work experience have seen their income fall in relation
to that of white males from seventy-nine percent to sixty-nine percent during the
same period, whereas black males who had completed college and had more than
six years of work experience have seen their income rise from seventy-five
percent of the income of their white counterparts to ninety-eight percent during
the same period.20 ' This evidence may imply that the benefits of affirmative
action flow disproportionately to the more highly educated members of outsider
groups.0 2 Despite the possible benefits of affirmative-action which apparently
flow toward educated blacks, it is important to understand that while "young
black men were murdered at the rate of about 45 per 100,000 in 1960 [six years
after Brown v. Board of Education], by 1990 the rate was 140 per 100,000. By
contrast, in 1990 for young white men the rate was 20 murder victims per
100,000.,203 Given that approximately sixty-eight percent of the prisoners in
state correctional institutions do not have a high school degree,0 4 education, or
the absence of it, will presumably continue to be a factor in the national and inner
city crime rate and the concurrent incarceration rate of black men. Meanwhile,
black poverty swells.205
199. THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 196 (1983).
200. Id. at 198.
201. Id. at 200-01.
202. It is possible that in societies where preferences are available, more highly
skilled members of preferred groups gamer a disproportionate share of the benefits while
"less skilled members of the preferred group incur disproportionate shares of the cost."
Harry Hutchison, Review Essay: Towards a Transnational Conception oftheAntiphonal
Group Rights Wrangle, 7 IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 245, 260-61 (1997). If this claim
is true, one can argue that if group-oriented policies are to be morally justifiable, the
benefits of such remedial preference programs should be made to predominately flow to
the less skilled, less educated and less fortunate among us.
203. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 20 (1997).
204. Zelman v. Simmons-Hams, 536 U.S. 639, 683 n.8 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
205. GATES, JR. & WEST, supra note 16, at xii.
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The breakdown of public education alone cannot explain all of these effects,
nor can it fully explain the attraction of vouchers to black Americans.0 6
Nevertheless, the ills which snag American public education breathe life into
Glenn Loury's assessment of Gunnar Myrdal's mid-twentieth century analysis,
which implies numerous and vicious circles of cumulative causation-self-
sustaining processes in which the failure of blacks to make progress justified for
whites the very prejudicial attitudes that, when reflected in social and political
action, served to ensure that blacks would not advance.2 7 Loury intimates that
a subtler version of this process is at work among us today as he lays "bare the
deeper, structural causes of African-American disadvantage."2 In the face of
this bleak picture, we must nonetheless remain skeptical of the contention "that
[an] adequate [public?] education can solve our most pressing social and political
problems. 20 9  Nevertheless, while eliminating the social and economic
disadvantages African-Americans currently experience is unlikely to be the prime
catalyst for political or judicial action in the United States, the much needed
removal of state sponsored disadvantage, in the form of subordinating ideology,
should be a vital factor in judging the legitimacy of opposition to programs that
may improve the educational life of black Americans and other outsider groups.
C. In Defense of Common Public Schools?
Among the contentious and dogmatic claims that foreshadow, explicate and
infuse the Zelman decision are the following: (1) the need for alternative forms
of educational delivery would be eviscerated if public schools were supplied with
smaller classes and more financial resources;2"0 (2) vouchers empower poorly
206. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 64, at 52; see also supra Part I.
207. LOURY, supra note 14, at 6. It is possible that various school reform efforts
spearheaded by educators and seconded by labor unions have not had a salutary effect on
students from low-income ethnic neighborhoods. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS
AND MINORrrIEs 112-13 (1981). On the other hand, the available evidence implies a
positive economic return to education for blacks, Hispanics and whites. See, e.g., id. at
22-23. During the period under consideration, however, Hispanic males averaged less
total education than either blacks or other whites but received a higher rate of return than
either on what education they received. Id.
208. LOURY, supra note 14, at 7.
209. Wilson, supra note 121, at 387. By contrast with this unproven assumption,
two authors point out many of the appalling images of blacks replete with a "parade of
Sambos, mammies, coons, uncles-bestial or happy-go-lucky, watermelon-
eating-African-Americans . . . . [were produced by] authors-cartoonists, writers,
filmmakers, and graphic designers-individuals, certainly, of higher than average
education." Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 191, at 218.
210. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 121, at 388. But see Reed, supra note 17. See
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informed and non-expert individuals (black parents?) to make poor choices;2 '
(3) anyone who supports private school choice in general or vouchers in
particular is a "racist;"21 and (4) "America's [educational, social and political]
success has been built on our ability to unify our diverse populations"2 3 through
enforced homogenization.
Before responding to these disparate charges directly, it is important to note
that, taken together or individually, these assertions disregard the true object of
education. They also expose an underlying debate over who, or what, is best
positioned to nurture a child. If the common public school "challenges parents'
exclusive right to control their children's destinies and to use children to preserve
and express parents' status and class,"'2 14 as one observer imagines, then it is
possible that the creation of school vouchers challenges the idea that both public
schools and the state should either become or remain the preeminent source of
meaning for all of America's students.21 5 Despite this challenge, and despite the
possibility that "forced homogeneity in the public schools [must] ultimately
fail, 216 it is vital to recall that it is the student's education, not the maintenance
or the erosion of the existing system of public education, that is at issue. The
indirect provision of public funds to private schools, which remain free of
complete control by public educational bureaucrats, brings this issue into sharper
focus despite the litany of charges that accompany and inflame the debate.
211. See Minow, supra note 22, at 1081-82 (citing Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20,
at 1412-20).
212. See Mackinac Center for Public Policy, MEA Lobbyist Calls Advocates of
Educational Choice "Racist", at http://www.mackinac.org/mea/iii.htm. The Michigan
Educational Association, a component part of the National Education Association,
America's largest teachers union, apparently, has engaged in other questionable behavior.
For instance, in a publication titled, Far Right/Extremist Attacks on Public Education,
the MEA attempts to marginalize Christian parents who speak up for their children's
interest by portraying them as part of a national conspiracy to end religious and academic
freedom. See Mackinac Center for Public Policy, MEA Demeans People of Faith, at
http://www.mackinac.org/mea/vii.htm.
213. National Education Association, Vouchers (2002), available at
http://www.nea.org/issues/vouchers (also available from the National Education
Association, 1201 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036).
214. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1112 (1992).
215. That is after all, why defenders of the status quo often refer to school choice
supporters as "racists" or engage in other efforts aimed at intimidation. See infra Part
III.C.2.
216. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37.
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1. Saving Public Schools by Providing More Resources and
Smaller Classes?
The contention that richly funded public schools characterized by smaller
classes will result in a high quality education for everyone, including those
disadvantaged by the existing system, is a dubious public policy claim that
confuses the voucher debate. One commentator contends that in "a time of
shrinking state revenues and substantial cuts in federal educational assistance, it
makes little sense to expropriate precious resources from the public schools and
give them to private schools." '217 Conversely, the evidence has largely debunked
these policy claims. "In the five years since 1997-98, revenues per student have
increased by more than a fifth (20.6 percent) .... [and] other new data...
suggest total expenditures per student could be even higher.... Taxpayers are
'paying prep school prices for public schools."'218 Lawrence Reed reports,
"Scholars have studied the relationship between per-student spending and
achievement test scores since the publication of 'Equality of Educational
Opportunity' (better known as 'The Coleman Report') in 1966." '219
[Professor] James Coleman, a leading sociologist, concluded that
factors such as per-pupil spending and class size do not have a
significant impact on student achievement scores. Economist Erik
Hanushek and others have replicated Coleman's study and even
extended it to international studies of student achievement. The
finding of over 30 years of their research is clear: More money does
not equal better education. There are schools, states, and countries that
spend a great deal of money per pupil with poor results, while others
spend much less and get much better results.22
"Between 1970 and 1997, total revenues for [America's] public schools
increased from $44.5 billion to over $305 billion. Yet scores on the SAT...
have dropped by 27 points at the same time."22' In a bizarre confirmation of the
law of unintended consequences, a federal judge in 1985 directed the Kansas
City, Missouri school district to devise a "'money-is-no-object' educational plan
217. Steven Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U.
CIN. L. REv. 37, 39 (1993). But see Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Marci Kanstoroom,
Improving, Empowering, Dismantling, 140 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 64 (2000) (suggesting
the power of reformist proposals that would empower principals).
218. George A. Clowes, Spending on Public Schools Soars, SCHOOL REFORM
NEWS, Aug. 2002 (published by the Heartland Institute, 19 South LaSalle St., Suite 903,
Chicago, IL 60603), available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artlD=1022.
219. Reed, supra note 17, at 4.
220. Reed, supra note 17, at 4-5.
221. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 43.
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to improve the education of black students and encourage desegregation." '222
"Kansas City spent more money per pupil, on a cost-of-living adjusted basis, than
any other of the 280 largest school districts in the United States... [with] field
trips to Mexico and Senegal, and higher teachers' salaries. The student-to-
teacher ratio was the lowest of any major school district in the nation at 13 to
1. ' Predictably, "[b]y the time the experiment ended in 1997, however, costs
mounted to nearly $2 billion, test scores did not rise, and there was less student
integration rather than more.'"24
On the other hand, the evidence from voucher programs shows both
educational progress and improved educational satisfaction for low-income
African-Americans. 225 In addition, another study based on a three-pronged
approach, that (a) focused on history, (b) examined trends in the kinds of systems
that worked either well or poorly across many different cultural settings, and (c)
inspected the educational outcomes when a given society abandoned one system
of education in favor of another, revealed that the current public education
system, however richly funded, will fail to deliver the results everyone desires.226
Andrew J. Coulson applied this three-pronged approach to a dozen civilizations,
including Greece in the fifth century B.C., the early medieval Muslim empire,
nineteenth century America and modem Japan.227 The conclusion: "[f]ree
education markets, in which parents choose their children's schools and schools
must compete with one another to attract and serve those children, consistently
outperform all other approaches to school governance. ' '228  Hence, the
background claim that the increased provision of resources inevitably results in
better public schools and therefore obviates the need to directly debate and to
consider school choice remains highly speculative at best. At worse, it represents
an attempt on dubious public policy grounds to thwart the promising educational
innovations, evidently, preferred by outsiders. Moreover, the imaginative claim
that vouchers will devastate public school funding remains unproven. 29
222. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 43.
223. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 43.
224. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 43.
225. Kirk A. Johnson & Krista Kafer, What the Harvard/Mathematica Study Says
About Vouchers and Low-Income African-American Students, available at
http://www.heritage.org.
226. ANDREW J. COULSON, WITH CLEAR EYES, SINCERE HEARTS AND OPEN MINDS
22 (2002), available at http://www.mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=4447 (also available
from the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 140 West Main Street, P.O. Box 568,
Midland, Michigan 48640).
227. Id. at 22-23.
228. Id. at 23.
229. To take the Cleveland program as an example, if total public funding for
education remains the same and voucher recipients leave the public school system for a
private school, the amount of dollars available on a per pupil basis might actually
increase within the public school system, since the voucher amount is significantly less
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2. Will Vouchers Empower Poor Black Parents to Make
Poor Choices?
Implicit in this charge is the presupposition that the government will make
better school selection choices than parents-particularly poor minority
parents.23 "Common sense and experience, however, tell us that most parents
... make good decisions with their children's best interests in mind."23' Some
parents may make poor decisions, but this is not a sustainable argument for
denying choice to everyone and especially to outsiders.232 The notion that
disadvantaged African-Americans and other outsiders must be protected from
bad choices ignores evidence that poor or uneducated parents are just as capable
as higher-income, better-educated parents of distinguishing between good and
bad schools.233 At best, the underlying charge, as Minow implies, is simply a
form of paternalism.234 At worse, the underlying charge implies a sustained
commitment to a dominating conception of choice that allows affluent parents
who have the resources to choose good school districts, while insisting on
conscription for disadvantaged parents and students. Although less temperate
observers may draw even more menacing conclusions from this contention,2" in
actuality, this charge disregards the possibility that real school choice may
provide:
[A] sense of ownership to the teachers, parents, and students, thereby
restoring morale and renewing commitment and creativity to the
educational process. Student aspirations to graduate increase, as do
parent and student satisfaction levels with the chosen school. Thus
school choice may effectively establish and maintain beneficial school
communities and cultures, thereby contributing indirectly to students'
academic and personal growth.236
than the State of Ohio's contribution to public schools. Thus the contention that
vouchers will devastate public school remains questionable. For details of the Cleveland
program, see infra Part IV.
230. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 41.
231. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 41.
232. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 41.
233. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 41.
234. See Minow, supra note 22, at 1081-82.
235. It is possible that less temperate observers may be tempted to conclude that
this charge is a mild form of Munchausen by proxy--pain is inflicted on outsiders
through a dominating and ineffective education system by elites. Outsiders are prevented
from escaping the public school system. Then more pain in the form of an ineffective
education is inflicted on their children. Meanwhile education bureaucrats and their
defenders heroically re-enter the fray with reworked but no less ineffective remedies.
236. Kevin Banasik, Book Review, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 519, 523 (1994)
(reviewing PETER W. COOKSTON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
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3. School Choice and Racism?
It is manifest that this charge, calculated to defend public schooling, brushes
aside the existence, and the genesis of, such Supreme Court cases as Brown v.
Board of Education237 and Plessy v. Ferguson.238 Although it has been asserted
that "[t]he extent to which we take the commitment to democracy seriously is
measured by the extent to which we take the commitment to education
seriously, 239 that claim, like many similar ones, neglects what Plessy and Brown
make obvious: separation, segregation and even racism (as well as democracy?)
were perhaps affirmed officially and unofficially in public education by the
common public school movement and in other contexts as well. David Berliner,
Dean of Education at Arizona State University, imagines, "Voucher programs
would allow for splintering along racial and ethnic lines . . . . [V]oucher
programs could end up resembling the ethnic cleansing occurring in Kosovo.
240
Reality is quite different. Contrary to the extravagant claims made by many of
the opponents of vouchers and public school defenders, the common public
school participated and contributed to racial fragmentation and subordination,24'
including the origination of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, whereas private
schools were and are less committed to, and retain less power to, enforce
dominant myths. They were, and are, therefore freer to enroll a diverse student
body.242 Cleveland's experience confirms this fact.243  Hence, the deeply
embedded contention that public as opposed to private education acts as a source
of racial harmony and that it fosters racial integration is, at best, doubtful. At
worst, the common public school is historically linked and ideologically
dedicated to hierarchy and subordination, as well as conscious and unconscious
racism. Since the racial stigmatization of African-Americans and other outsiders
is reinforced by economic and social deprivation, the practice of precluding low-
income African-Americans from exiting failing and highly segregated public
schools fortifies racial stigma and self-confirming stereotypes. Together, they
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1994)).
237. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
238. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
239. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1671, 1697 (1990).
240. DANIEL MCGROARTY, TRINNIETTA GETS A CHANCE: SIX FAMILIES AND THEIR
SCHOOL CHOICE EXPERIENCE 133 (2001).
241. See supra Part III.B.
242. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 36-37.
243. MCGROARTY, supra note 240, at 133 ("Nearly a fifth of the participants in
[the Cleveland program] attend private schools that have a racial composition that
resembles the average racial composition of the Cleveland area. Only 5.2% of public
school students attend similarly integrated schools.").
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"exert[] an inhibiting effect on the extent to which African-Americans can realize,
their full human potential." 2'"
Nevertheless, the intuition that school choice is a racist vehicle is a serious
charge. It deserves an answer. This charge likely reflects the belief that if it can
be effectively alleged that racists support vouchers then the voucher idea will be
seen as a racist initiative. Moreover, a majority of members of current racial
outsider groups (including blacks) favor school choice, including vouchers,245
because private schools are vastly more integrated than public schools, and
because such schools apparently provide a better education for disadvantaged
children than public schools. Therefore, the claim that "anyone who supports
school choice is a racist" must evidently be offered as a dubious deontological
claim that blacks and outsiders are simply more inclined to racism than whites.
Perforce, the determination of racial outsiders to champion school-choice
alternatives exposes them to two dire possibilities: they can suppress their
preferences and continue to tolerate poor schools, or they can defy sustained
subordination by demanding school choice while being exposed to the risk that
they, and other supporters of vouchers, will be identified as "racists" by the
highly compensated246 protectors of the existing public school monopoly. But in
a nation in which some liberal theorists have singled out religious motivation "as
belonging to the set of evil state motives, like racial bigotry," '47 one should not
be surprised to find that African-American and other school choice supporters are
branded bigots by those who would advance liberal/republican hegemony at the
expense of African-American priorities. This should startle no one. Just as
Horace Mann imposed his Protestant brand of "nonsectarianism" while
concomitantly accusing his opponents of sectarianism, contemporary defenders
of the often exclusionary common public school accuse their opponents of being
infected with a virus that may well apply to them.
244. LOURY, supra note 14, at 5.
245. See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 77 (explaining that parents want academic
excellence for their children and want to know that there is someone who is accountable
for achieving high academic standards), available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/cb_20.htm.
246. For example, in the State of Michigan, employees of the largest teacher's
union, the Michigan Education Association earn salaries more than twice as high as the
average teacher according to U.S. Department of Labor data. See MEA Employee
Salaries Well Above Teachers': Highly Paid Union Officials Oppose Cost-Saving
Measures for Schools, MICH. EDUC. DIGEST, .Sept. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.mackinac.org/pubs/mer/article.asp?ID=3735.
247. Carter, supra note 64, at 53.
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4. Seeing Salvation and National Unity in the Form of
Public Education?
Racial stratification and disparity between blacks and whites in terms of
wages, mortality and unemployment has likely worsened over the past quarter-
century.21 8 At the same time, an increasingly homogenized, so-called common
public education has often been depicted as part of an American story "led by
benevolent and disinterested reformers, from the darkness of ignorance to the
light of equal opportunity through free public education,"249 and the Supreme
Court has rightly rejected the notion that the state retains the power to standardize
its children through public education.25 However, it is possible to understand
"the common school movement and 'progressive' school reformers themselves
as agents of a ruling business elite that effectively subjugated working-class and
especially immigrant children through a form of cultural imperialism."25' This
conclusion underscores the observation that "[t]hroughout history, governments
have used their established schools to repress members of ill-regarded groups,
whether religious, ethnic, or racial." '252 On the other hand, while the history of
private education with respect to the education of outsiders is often chilling, it is
plain that private schools as part of the "free educational markets have
consistently allowed a harmonious coexistence of different moral, religious, and
pedagogical views in a way that government schools have not and, by their very
nature, cannot." '253
To repeat, American public schools owe a good deal of their founding
philosophy to Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann, and other educational
reformers. 4 These purportedly "peaceful legislators of reason" '255 "believed that
rational empiricism and enlightened moralism should be substituted for explicitly
Christian doctrines which at the time were guiding many families, schools, and
churches." 56 Public education today, not unlike public education 150 years
ago,"' represents education from a particular perspective.'" In essence,
decentralized and privately ordered social norms2 59 were swapped for mandatory
248. LOURY, supra note 14, at 4.
249. Woodhouse, supra note 214, at 1005.
250. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
251. Woodhouse, supra note 214, at 1005.
252. Coulson, supra note 120, at 68.
253. Coulson, supra note 120, at 68.
254. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 61.
255. FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 33, at 10.
256. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 61.
257. Hunter, supra note 153, at 69.
258. Hunter, supra note 153, at 69.
259. For a perceptive discussion ofthejurisprudence that supports decentralization
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homogenesis in the form of government-established and government-funded
norms derived from government-run schools, which were made acceptable to the
majority.26 One insightful anti-slavery commentator anticipated the deficiencies
of this approach. He "rejected the argument that the public school was necessary
to create a common American nationality from disparate elements. That popular
notion... served to make social conformity into the highest American value.
Such a degraded ideal was [not an] adequate basis on which to build a vibrant
culturally diverse nation. '  He concluded that attempts to eliminate
heterogeneity by force within the public school context must backfire 262-"a
coerced union engenders restless longings for disunion, a union in which there
is the conscious freedom to separate is likely to be a contented and happy one." '263
Historically, the creation of coercively homogenized public schools grounded in
ostensibly enlightened and consilient2" elucidations of human meaning
developed into an exclusionary bulwark against the influx of largely Catholic
and private ordering of social norms in contradistinction to centralized democracy, see
John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485, 487-97 (2002).
260. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 61.
261. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37.
262. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37.
263. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37. This is not an argument against harmony but
an argument in favor of a distinctly different way to achieve it.
264. For a defense of the Enlightenment, see, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE: THE UNIY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998) and Edward 0. Wilson, Resuming the
Enlightenment Quest, 22 WILSON Q. 16 (Winter 1998). But see Richard Rorty, Against
Unity, 22 WILSON Q. 28 (Winter 1998). For argument that the vocabulary of
Enlightenment rationalism, although vital to the beginnings of liberal democracy, has
become an obstacle to the preservation and progress of democratic societies giving rise
to the need to reformulate the hopes of the liberal society in a nonrationalist and
nonuniversalist way, see RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 44-69
(1989). But as I have hinted at elsewhere, "the notion of [human] 'progress' remains
dubious." See Harry G. Hutchison, The Semiotics ofLabor Law, Trade Unions and Work
in East Asia: International "Labor Standards " in the Mirror of Culture?, 14 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 1451, 1457 n.24 (2000); see also Robert K. Merton, Foreword to ELLUL,
supra note 119, at viii ("Progress then consists in progressive de-humanization-busy,
pointless, and, in the end, suicidal submission to technique.").
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immigrants2 6' and the children of ex-slaves. Evidently, as Arons demonstrates,
this effort to compel belief continues today.
2 66
Nevertheless, just as the German romantics challenged the Enlightenment
appeal to the notion of universal reason in the name of culture,267 there is reason
to question the appeal of public school systems derived from Enlightenment
penumbras to all parents and children everywhere. The liberal state's imposition
of a centralized conception of the good in the form of public schools evidently
fails to consider the possibility that, "considered objectively (that is, outside any
particular religious viewpoint), religions have flourished precisely because they
offer more efficacious frameworks for certain social norms than secular
organizations."26 Conversely, "[p]ublic schools [today] ... are not... directly
dependent on, and beholden to, their local constituencies-because these local
constituencies are not the main source of their funds. Public education, then, is
... likely to reflect the interests of the secular bureaucracy of the modem state
from which it derives and on which it depends. 2 69  The imposition of
Jeffersonian beliefs, other like-minded values or even opposing views, likely
reflects "the vested interests and cultural orientation of a larger category of
cultural elites-not only those who design educational curricula but other arbiters
of social taste and opinion (such as journalists, lawyers, professors, and so on)"'27
as opposed to local or community constituencies.
While most centralized state common public schools today are unlikely to
offer either Jeffersonian or Mannian morality, they must offer some kind of
ideology or morality, whether congruent with the Humanism of Charles Francis
Potter or some other organizing theory of meaning.
Potter, one of the signers of the Humanist Manifesto I wrote:
"Education is thus a most powerful ally of Humanism, and every
265. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 61; see also GREELEY & Rossi, supra note 167,
at 2-7.
The historical roots of the Catholic school lead back mainly to the nineteenth
century, when the commitment of the American population to mass public
schooling began to be formed. The 'common schools' of the eighteenth
century were . .. community schools in the sense that they took on the
doctrinal coloration of the communities which supported them .... In the
early nineteenth century two trends developed to produce a different kind of
'common school' .... To the American Catholic hierarchy of the nineteenth
century, the public schools appeared to be increasinglyneutral against Roman
Catholicism.
GREELEY & Rossi, supra note 167, at 2-3.
266. ARONS, supra note 24, at 190-221.
267. FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 33, at 10.
268. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 506 n.96.
269. Hunter, supra note 153, at 69.
270. Hunter, supra note 153, at 69.
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American public school is a school of Humanism. What can the
theistic Sunday Schools, meeting for an hour once a week, and
teaching only a fraction of the children, do to stem the tide of a five-
day program of humanistic teaching?"27'
Whether these views are secular ideology or merely an article of faith, it is vital
to note that "ideology can operate to replace, or play the role of religion; ... the
liberal belief in the autonomy of consciousness is revealed as an undisclosed
commitment in mainstream jurisprudence." '272 It remains possible that the
"official formulation of truth, proper behavior, and acceptable belief in [public]
schools has never attained a coherence sufficient to prove the existence of a
[secular] conspiracy to mold children in a single image."273 The liberal order and
liberal belief may not always constitute a single or uniform set of beliefs-in fact,
liberalism is constituted by often-contradictory beliefs and opinions.
Nevertheless, just as common public schools were transformed by time and
circumstance to become neutral against Catholics, today's common public
schools, as a central component of the liberal state, must become neutral against
other competing forms of belief. A group or family that asserts diverse
beliefis], values, [and] world view[s] ... is a dissenting family, not
only because they reject the dominant ethic of majority culture or have
been attacked by the bureaucratized agents of that culture but because
they seek to create meaning where they perceive only pervasive
alienation and voracious skepticism. Whatever the differences of
values among these families [religious or not], they have in common
the sense that the assumptions of majority culture [in the form of public
schools] have lost their power of explanation and prediction and that
that culture is confused, self-contradicting, or collapsing.274
Liberalism and democracy are apparently "legitimized incursions of the state into
family affairs based on the utilitarian view that such incursions reflected majority
rule. The rights of the family, particularly on religion, were to be sacrificed for
the good of the community." '275 Here again, the public school system creates
another group of outsiders-those individuals who might be interested in either
a religious or nonreligious (but dissimilar to the one on offer from the state) kind
of education for their children. This conclusion may contribute to the view that
271. Hunter, supra note 153, at 70.
272. David S. Caudill, Law and Belief: Critical Legal Studies and Philosophy of
the Law-Idea, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 54, at 109, 110.
273. ARONS, supra note 24, at x.
274. ARONS, supra note 24, at 192.
275. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 62.
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the liberal "conception of democracy is failing not only people of color, 27 6 but
others as well. But as public choice theory implies, such a failure, as a form of
pathological behavior that favors the strong at the expense of others, is consistent
with the history of all majoritarian democracies.277
V. ANALYZING THE ZELMAN DECISION
School vouchers "have generated a vigorous debate in the media and in the
legislative chambers." '278 "Given the gravity of the policy issues"'" at stake, it
would have been astonishing if the Court had declined to rule on the validity of
the Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship Program ("Pilot Project"). The Ohio
State Legislative initiative implicates the "government's claim to the power and
competence to draw and police a line between religious and [secular]
expression."28 The Pilot Project arguably raises "provocative questions about
the nature of religious faith[,] . . . the meaning of religious freedom, the
ideological ambitions of the contemporary liberal state, and the roles played in
civil society by religious and other associations that mediate between persons and
government."2 '' It also raises questions concerning the capability of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to accommodate outsiders.
The State of Ohio established a Pilot Project calculated to provide
educational choices to families with children who reside in the Cleveland City
School District. The "school district meets none of the State's 27 minimum
performance standards.... Despite per-pupil outlays of roughly $7,000-twice
the state average, and well above the national average-more than two-thirds of
the district's students drop or flunk out before their graduation." '282 Moreover,
"Cleveland's school dropout rates are linked to high rates of unemployment, drug
and alcohol abuse, teen pregnancy, welfare dependency, infant mortality, and
crime. These problems are especially pronounced for racial minorities....
[M]ore than 55 percent of black men living in Cleveland are unemployed. 283
"There are substantial reasons both in educational theory and in the experience
of other areas to believe that school choice will improve the performance not only
of students who choose alternative schools, but of those who choose public
276. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 65, at 96.
277. See, e.g., Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 25-26.
278. Recent Case, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), 114
HARV. L. REV. 2201,2201 (2001).
279. Id. at 2201.
280. Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 773 (2001).
281. Id. at 773-74.
282. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 140, at 1.
283. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 140, at 1-2.
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schools which are forced to compete .... The question here, however, is not
whether that prediction is correct ... but whether it can be put to the test.
284
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that the Pilot Project violated the
Establishment Clause as "both the majority and the dissent strained to fit the facts
of the case into the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents and thus
failed to confront the novel issue posed by the case." '285 One commentator
suggests that the quintessential issue is "how to evaluate a voucher program that
is not clearly designed to favor sectarian schools but that overwhelmingly
benefits those schools, and in which the presence or absence of genuine parental
choice is uncertain. '286 That is, of course, simply one way of posing the issue.
Because "[t]he debate over the proper interpretation and meaning of the
Establishment Clause is often influenced, at least in part, by the particular
commentator's 'separationist' or 'accomodationist' agenda, '"87 alternative ways
of framing the pertinent issue are available. One such formulation is how the
Establishment Clause can accommodate the wishes of African-Americans and
other outsiders driven by exigent circumstance to seek alternative sources of
education when, and if, the current public schools system has been found so
deficient that a federal court has mandated a state takeover.
A. Background of the Cleveland Initiative: Favoring
Low-Income Families
The Cleveland City School District enrolls more than 75,000 pupils. It is
undisputed2.. that the "majority of these children are from low-income and
minority families. Few of these families enjoy the means to send their children
to any school other than an inner-city public school."2 9 For "more than a
generation, however, Cleveland's public schools have been among the worst
performing public schools in the Nation. '29 In fact, in "1995, a Federal District
Court declared a 'crisis of magnitude' and placed the entire Cleveland school
284. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 140, at 3 (emphasis added).
285. Recent Case, supra note 278, at 2201.
286. Recent Case, supra note 278, at 2201.
287. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1318 n.2.
288. In fact, Justice Stevens' dissent explicitly concedes this fact yet both ignores
and denies the relevance of the "severe educational crisis that confronted the Cleveland
City School District." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 684 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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district under state control."29' "It is against this backdrop that Ohio enacted,
among other initiatives, its Pilot Project Scholarship Program. '292
The Pilot Project grants tuition assistance to parents based on financial need
with the neediest receiving larger assistance.29 This case differs "from prior
indirect aid cases in part because a significant portion of the funds appropriated
for the voucher program reach religious schools without restrictions on the use
of these funds." '294 The Pilot Project includes:
two basic kinds of assistance to parents of children .... First, the
program provides tuition aid for students in kindergarten through third
grade, expanding each year through eighth grade, to attend a
participating public or private school of their parent's choosing.
Second, the program provides tutorial aid for students who choose to
remain enrolled in public school. The tuition aid portion of the [Pilot
Project] is [intended] to provide educational choices to parents who
reside in [the Cleveland City School District]. Any private school,
291. Id. The school district had "failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for
minimal acceptable performance. Only I in 10 ninth graders could pass a basic
proficiency examination, and students at all levels performed at a dismal rate compared
with students in other Ohio public schools. More than two-thirds of high school students
either dropped or failed out before graduation.... Of those students who did graduate,
few could read, write, or compute at levels comparable to their counterparts in other
cities." Id.
292. Id.; OHlo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (Anderson 2002).
293. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45.
Families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and
are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. For these
lowest income families, participating private schools may not charge a
parental copayment greater than $250. For all other families, the program
pays 75% of tuition costs, up to $1,875, with no copayment cap. These
families receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships
exceeds the number of low-income children who choose to participate....
The tutorial aid portion of the program provides tutorial assistance through
grants to any student in a covered district who chooses to remain in public
school. Students from low-income families receive 90% of the amount
charged for such assistance up to $360. All other students receive 75% of that
amount.
Id. at 646 (internal citations omitted). Apparently, adjacent schools would receive
between $4,750 and $6,544 per program students. Id. at 646 n. 1.
294. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the other hand, the program
provides only $8.2 million in total assistance, which "pales in comparison to the amount
of funds that federal, state, and local governments already provide religious institutions."
Id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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whether religious or nonreligious, may participate... so long as the
school is located within the appropriate boundaries.295
The school's participation is subject to its agreement "not to discriminate on the
basis of race, religion or ethnic background or to... teach hatred of any person
or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion." '296 In
addition, "[a]ny public school located in a school district adjacent to the covered
districtmay also participate in the program."297 Funding for participating public
schools located in adjacent school districts includes "a $2,250 tuition grant for
each program student accepted in addition to the full amount of per-pupil state
funding attributable to each additional student." 98 As an apparent safeguard,
"[a]ll participating schools, whether public or private, are required to accept
students in accordance with rules and procedures established by the state
superintendent. 29
9
Although the Pilot Project has operated within the Cleveland City School
District since the 1996-1997 school year, none of the adjacent districts have
elected to participate."' A majority of the 3,700 scholarship program students
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools, while approximately 1,400 public school
students received tutorial aid.3"' The Court found that the program "is part of a
broader undertaking by the State to enhance the educational options of
Cleveland's schoolchildren in response to the 1995 takeover."30 2 Apparently,
"[t]hat undertaking includes programs governing community and magnet
schools. 3 3  Both the district court and the court of appeals disallowed the
program since it "had the 'primary effect' of advancing religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause."30




299. Id. at 645-46.
300. Id. at 647.
301. Id.; see, e.g., id. at 700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 647.
303. Id. "Community schools are funded under state law but are run by their own
school boards, not by local school districts. These schools enjoy academic independence
.... They can have no religious affiliation and are required to accept students by lottery.
During the 1999-2000 school year, there were 10 start-up community schools in the
Cleveland City School District with more than 1,900 students enrolled .... Magnet
schools are public schools operated by a local school board that emphasize a particular
subject area, teaching method, or service to students .... As of 1999, parents in
Cleveland were able to choose from among 23 magnet schools which together enrolled
more than 13,000 students." Id. at 647-48.
304. Id. at 648.
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B. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Unavoidably, this Subsection's analysis of the Establishment Clause
overlaps Part V's thematic outsider-premised-fairness approach. In any case,
both the majority and the dissent endeavored to determine "whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion [and]
whether the aid has the 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion.""3 5 This line
of attack has always been a thorny and confusing exercise. It is, nevertheless,
faithful to the belief that the Constitution fails to tell judges or anyone else
"where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education."306 Consistent
with this claim, "in Torcaso v. Watkins, Justice Black indicated that nontheistic
religions were protected by the first amendment, listing ethical culture and
secular humanism as examples.""3 7 Furthering this perspective, "Justice Harlan
suggested the significance of these holdings for the establishment clause: 'any
• ..exceptions [granted for free exercise purposes] in order to satisfy the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment would have to be sufficiently
broad to be religiously neutral."3 Laurence Tribe contends that "the notion of
religion in the free exercise clause must be expanded beyond the closelybounded
limits of theism to account for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate
religious exercise ...[but] in the age of the affirmative and increasingly
pervasive state, a less expansive notion of religion was required for establishment
clause purposes lest all 'humane' programs of government be deemed
constitutionally suspect,"3 9 thus raising the question of whether the Pilot Project,
which reflects an affirmative and increasingly pervasive state, must be quashed
because it is insufficiently "humane."
The Zelman Court states, "There is no dispute that the program... was
enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor
children in a demonstrably failing public school system."3 ' The dissent
concurs. 31 1 For instance, Justice Souter attests that the "record indicates that the
schools are failing to serve their objective, and the vouchers in issue here are said
to be needed to provide adequate alternatives to them."3"2 The contested terrain
305. Id. at 648-49 (emphasis added).
306. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign
County, II1., 333 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
307. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIUTIoNALLAw832 (1978) (discussing
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)).
308. Id. at 832-33 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 358 n.9 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result)).
309. Id. at 827-28.
310. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
311. Id. at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens both
decline to deny the secular purpose of the challenged program.
[Vol. 68
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/2
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
is cabined by this question: "whether the Ohio program... has the forbidden
'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." '313 The dissent variously maintains
that any aid to religious schools cannot be seen as neutral, remains skeptical that
even neutrality is sufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny and fears the possible
corruption of religious institutions through the infusion of public funds and
accompanying regulations. Perforce, the Pilot Project constitutes a coercive and
disabling entanglement that engenders strife requiring judicial invalidation. The
Court disagrees.
The Court maintains that it has "drawn a consistent distinction between
government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools . . . and
programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious
schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private
individuals."3 4 Whether it has always preserved the consistency it desires is
debatable. The Court states, "While our jurisprudence with respect to the
constitutionality of direct aid programs has 'changed significantly' over the past
two decades.., our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs
has remained consistent and unbroken."3 5 The Court cited its earlier decision
holding that where "the program 'distributes benefits neutrally to any child
qualifying as "disabled"' . .. [i]ts 'primary beneficiaries' . .. were 'disabled
children, not sectarian schools."'316 Accordingly, "where a government aid
program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a
broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the
program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause."3'17
Perforce, any government assistance that reaches a religious institution does so
313. Id. at 649.
314. Id.
315. Id. Justice Rehnquist, for the court states: "Three times we have confronted
Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly
to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or
institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges." Id.
Among other things, the Court cites Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota program that authorized tax deductions
for various educational expenses including private school tuition costs, even though the
great majority of the program's beneficiaries (ninety-six percent) were parents of children
in religious schools); Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481,488 (1986) (Examining the program as a whole, "[a]ny aid.., that ultimately
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients."); and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills SchoolDistrict, 509
U.S. 1 (1993) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that
permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
316. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 12).
317. Id. at 652.
2003]
47
Hutchison: Hutchison: Liberal Hegemony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
only as a result of the deliberate choices made by individual recipients.3 t Any
actual, apparent or alleged endorsement of a religious message is largely
"attributable to the individual recipients, not the government, whose role ends
with the disbursement of benefits."3 9 In essence, the Pilot Project has an
undisputed secular purpose, honors neutrality and only provides benefits to
religious institutions by virtue of the private choices made by individuals. Thus,
it could be said, that when the Court determines whether religion is inhibited or
advanced by a contested government practice, it is looking into the meaning of
a practice already assumed by culture.32 ° The Court concludes, "the program
permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or
nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a financial
incentive to do so.... The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a
preference for low-income families, who receive greater assistance""32 when they
participate in private schools.
This conclusion is hardly correct because the program expresses a broad
preference for non-private (meaning largely nonreligious) schools-it provides
greater financial assistance to community schools, magnet schools and to
participating adjacent schools than participating private schools. Despite its
decision to validate the Pilot Project, the majority nonetheless favors the common
public school. Thus, the contention that the program neutrally funds children in
private or public school is unproven. In fact, the Court is compelled to concede
this point.322 Nonetheless, despite the financial preference granted to public
community and magnet schools, the majority opinion is doubtlessly correct when
it contends that "[t]here are no 'financial incentive[s]' that 'ske[w]' the program
toward religious schools." '323 The fact that forty-six of the fifty-six participating
schools are religious is, therefore, dismissed as irrelevant.324 Because the
"constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 359.
321. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653.
322. The opinion notes that Pilot Project creates financial disincentives for
religious schools. See id. at 654.
323. Id. at 653 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)). On the other hand, "Justice Souter suggests the program is not
'neutral' because program students cannot spend scholarship vouchers at traditional
public schools." Id. at 654 n.3. He apparently ignores the fact that public schools in
Cleveland already receive more than $7,000 in public funding per pupil of which more
than $4,100 is attributable to the state. Id. at 654 n.3. Accordingly, scholarship
recipients who attend private school receive little more than fifty percent of the state
funding available to program students who receive tutoring aid and remain enrolled in
traditional public schools. Id.
324. Id. at 655.
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are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a
religious school,"32 it is also irrelevant that ninety-six percent of the participating
students attend religious schools.3 2' Furthermore, the Court rejects the argument
that even if the program provides no financial incentive for parents to choose a
religious school, the program nevertheless creates a perception in the public mind
that the State is endorsing religious practices and belief,327 because any
levelheaded onlooker must be conscious of the history and context underlying the
challenged program.328
Observers familiar with the full history and context of the Pilot Project
would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor
children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in
general. 29 For all these reasons the Court rejects the assertion that the Pilot
Project coerces parents into sending their children to religious schools. 30 It
consequently scraps the contention that because more religious schools, as
opposed to nonreligious ones, currently participate in the Pilot Project, the
program must discourage the participation of private nonreligious schools.
Indeed, the dominance of private religious schools within the private school
market of both Cleveland and Ohio preceded the enactment of the Pilot
Project. 131
Because the Court found a secular purpose, and because the program did not
favor religious schools, the Court effortlessly eviscerated the respondents'
reliance on Committeefor Public Edudcation and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist132
Two reasons are offered: (1) the program challenged in Nyquist involved a New
York program that supplied a package of benefits exclusively to private schools
animated by the desire to provide financial support for nonpublic, sectarian
325. Id. at 658. Significantly, "[e]xperience in Milwaukee, which since 1991 has
operated an educational choice program similar to the Ohio program, demonstrates that
the mix of participating schools fluctuates significantly from year to year based on a
number of factors, one of which is the uncertainty caused by persistent litigation....
Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the Milwaukee program constitutional in
1998... several nonreligious private schools have entered the Milwaukee market and
now represent 32% of all participating schools... [and] the number of program students
attending nonreligious private schools increased from 2,048 to 3,582; these students now
represent 33% of all program students." Id. at 660 n.5 (internal citations omitted).
326. Id. at 659.
327. Id. at 654.
328. Id. at 655.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 654-59. But see id. at 698-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 656-57. Apparently, eighty-two percent of Cleveland's participating
private schools are religious schools and eighty-one percent of Ohio's private schools are
religious. Id. at 657.
332. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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institutions,"33 and (2) the Nyquist program was "far removed from the program
challenged here ... [where] 'some form of public'assistance ... [was] made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." 334 Accordingly, neither the rule
of, nor the concern of Nyquist, involving the invisible specters of "divisiveness"
and "religious strife," are present here.33 Moreover, the "program has ignited no
divisiveness or strife other than this litigation. 336
C. Concurring Views
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas joined the decision of the Court,
writing separately to emphasize certain decisive considerations. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence concentrates chiefly on the Establishment Clause.
Justice Thomas prefers to supply context, including the pressing need to provide
improved educational opportunities for underprivileged minority students. This
context enlarges his perspective on Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Justice O'Connor supplies two arguments. First, she verifies that "when
considered in light of other longstanding government programs that impact
religious organizations and our prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence," '337 the
Zelman holding and decision fails to constitute a dramatic break from the past.33 '
Second, Justice O'Connor affirms that when parents of voucher students in
religious schools exercise true private choice, the proper inquiry "should consider
all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to
parents."339 To do otherwise underestimates "how the educational system in
Cleveland actually functions.""34 Justice O'Connor's concurrence, consistent
with Martha Minow's observation, points out that government dollars already
reach a diverse group of religiously affiliated organizations in very substantial
amounts3"' "without restrictions on its subsequent use." '342 Justice O'Connor
notes that "the support that the Cleveland voucher program provides religious
institutions is neither substantial nor atypical of existing government
programs." '343 If this is true, should the Court be more sensitive about
government funds reaching religious institutions and providing aid and assistance
333. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661.
334. Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.38).
335. Id. at 662 n.7.
336. Id. at 661. On the possibility of religious strife, see infra Part V.A.
337. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
338. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
339. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
340. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
341. Id. at 666-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 667 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to predominately black students in a failed public school system unless the Court
is predisposed to prop up the common public school and the set of dominant
values and assumptions for which it stands? Justice O'Connor believes such
sensitivity is not warranted. The Pilot Project is at least as neutral as countless
other government programs, which indirectly aid religious institutions.3"
Turning to the question of neutrality, Justice O'Connor concludes that the
neutrality of the program "should be gauged not by the opportunities it presents
but rather by its effects." '345 She resolves that determining whether a program is
neutral should turn on whether government aid is "made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."3" She discards
the assumption that neutrality is vitiated when and if the recipient religious
institutions enjoy an alleged cost advantage over competing public institutions.347
She also refutes the contention that the Pilot Project's tuition assistance unjustly
encourages low-income students to attend a religious school because that claim
takes no notice of the fact that "these students [would] receive nearly double the
amount of tuition assistance under the community schools program... [and]
none of the community schools is religious."348
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas begins with Frederick Douglass'
declaration that "education... means emancipation. It means light and liberty.
It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light
by which men can only be made free." '349 While the veracity of that statement
may have been self-evident when it was spoken, it remains doubtful that what
passes for contemporary education, both within America's inner cities and
elsewhere in the country,justifies those sentiments today. Conversely, it remains
incontestably true that "urban children have been forced into a system that
continually fails them."3' 0 Turning to the Establishment Clause, Justice Thomas
examines the text which states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." '351 Despite its proscription against congressional
conduct, one can plausibly conclude that "[o]n its face, this provision places no
limit on the States with regard to religion."3 2 This conclusion reflects the view
344. Id. at 670 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor states, "There is little
question in my mind that the Cleveland voucher program is neutral as between religious
schools and nonreligious school[s]." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
345. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
346. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
348. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
349. Id. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring). This perspective may echo Stephen
Carter's intuition that the current liberal order has been transmuted from its
Enlightenment based concern with the question, what is best for man to this question
what is best for me? Carter, supra note 64, at 46.
350. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring).
351. Id. at 678 (Thomas, J., concurring).
352. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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that the Establishment Clause, as originally enacted, protected individuals, states,
and by extension, their citizens from the imposition of an established religion by
the government of the United States.353 Justice Thomas concedes that the Clause
possibly constrains state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, but what
action is constrained is far from clear.354 One view suggests that the Fourteenth
Amendment "added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and
to the security of personal liberty." '355 Parenthetically, it is equally clear that the
United States Supreme Court, in 1896, thought the Fourteenth Amendment was
simply too frail an instrument to prevent the state of Louisiana from requiring
"equal but separate accommodations" for black and white passengers.356
In any case, Justice Thomas accepts Justice Harlan's conclusion that when
"rights are incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
they should advance, not constrain, individual liberty."3" On Justice Thomas'
account, "it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms
than similar action by the federal government." '358 This perspective favors
federalism by encouraging free experimentation, so long as the state adheres to
"neutrality." '359 Thus, the religious liberty right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, as incorporated by the Establishment Clause, cannot be deployed
to "oppose neutral programs of school choice."36 In order to fully appreciate this
approach, he provides context (the educational crisis in Cleveland) while
dismissing the assertion that parents are coerced to enroll their children into
religious, largely Catholic, schools.36'
353. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). One observer explains that "the Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states, and at the time of its adoption, six of the thirteen states
maintained religious establishments. Far from prohibiting these arrangements, the First
Amendment was enacted in part to protect state religious establishments from federal
interference," Sandel, supra note 33, at 74, 79.
354. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 678-80 (Thomas, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
doctrine of incorporation that examines the combination of the First Amendment's
freedom of speech provision and the Fourteenth Amendment, see JOHN H. GARVEY,
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, at 223-39 (1996). "There can be little doubt that those who
wrote the first amendment intended it to apply only to the federal government." Id. at
223.
355. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 678 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
356. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543-44.
357. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 678 (Thomas, J., concurring).
358. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
359. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 259, at 509 ("Federalism not only sustains
civil associations, its very structure builds into political life some of the advantages of
spontaneous order.").
360. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring).
361. Id. at 680-81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Contextually, he admits that "[r]eligious schools, like other private schools,
achieve far better educational results than their public counterparts," 36 2 though
he contends that such success "is in the end beside the point, because the State
has a constitutional right to experiment with a variety of different programs to
promote educational opportunity." 36 3 Justice Thomas questionably supports the
majoritarian notion that "one of the purposes of public schools was to promote
democracy and a more egalitarian culture. ' 364 He is correct in his observation
that "failing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority children
most in need of educational opportunity. "365 Significantly, if one presumes that
the expressed desires of blacks are important, it is useful to note that at the time
of the Reconstruction blacks considered public education "a matter of personal
liberation and necessary function of a free society. '366 Also relevant is the
conclusion that most low income parents, as well as a majority of black and
Hispanic parents, support vouchers,367 because the "failure to provide education
to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence,
criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their lives. If
society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can arm minorities with the
education to defend themselves from some of discrimination's effects.
3 68
D. Dissenting Views
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer wrote separately to express their
disagreement with the holding in Zelman. The three dissenting views express
disparate points, but act as mirror images on one issue: the potential divisiveness
of the Pilot Project. While I will not offer a critique of all of his views, I will
initially examine the primary content of Justice Stevens' argument before
considering the claims of his colleagues.
Justice Stevens dismisses as irrelevant three aspects of the Pilot Project: (1)
the educational crisis confronting parents and students, (2) the broad range of
choices that are made available to students within the public school system, and
(3) "the voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education
over a" public school education.369 Crucially, Justice Stevens yearns to remain
oblivious to the plight of African-Americans even though this animates outsiders'
desire for the creation of independent choice to change their existing educational
circumstances. His dissent requires context. Although Justice Stevens remains
362. Id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
363. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
364. Id. at 681-82 (Thomas, J., concurring).
365. Id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
366. Id. at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 682 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
369. Id. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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unwilling to interpret the Constitution flexibly to provide African-Americans and
other outsiders with an opportunity for experimentation which may improve their
educational circumstances, some Critical Race scholarship suggests that many
liberals (including Justice Stevens) are quite willing to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment flexibly to reify "race conscious" affirmative-action programs and
policies37 ° which may "confer a benefit on white elite groups"37" ' while
"perpetuat[ing] the existing racial hierarchy." '372 Because race conscious
remedies were designed by members of dominant groups, and they produce
rather scarce results and retain a "dubious lineage," '373 it is doubtful that they
necessarily and primarily serve the purposes of outsiders. Instead, such remedies
vindicate elite ideals. 74 This assessment raises questions about Justice Stevens'
ability to interpret separate sections of the Constitution in a consistent manner,
but consistency may be possible. Justice Stevens can plausibly deploy an
inflexible interpretation of the Establishment Clause to thwart any educational
experimentation, which may benefit blacks in a way that is consistent with a
flexible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and which extends race
conscious remedies, because both approaches may provide primary benefits to
white elite groups.
Justice Stevens' third point is an effective admission that the program fails
to coerce parents into sending their children to private religious schools. Next,
Justice Stevens (like Justices Breyer and Souter) contends that his resistance to
the Pilot Project is animated by his "understanding of the impact of religious
strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent, and on the
decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to
mistrust one another." '375  That raises the question: "Does his evolving
worldview, social analysis, and moral vision enable us to understand and endure
this 'first century of world wars'.., in which nearly 200 million fellow human
beings have been murdered in the name of some pernicious ideology?" a76 Those
deaths, unattached as they are to religious disputes, are, perhaps unintentionally,
minimized by and subordinated to Justice Stevens' worldview. He also contends,
"Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate
370. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 n.1 (1995)
(Steven, J., dissenting).
371. See Delgado, supra note 53, at 1559.
372. See Delgado, supra note 53, at 1559.
373. See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Do You
Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1222 (199 1).
374. Delgado, supra note 53, at 1559.
375. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the
foundation of our democracy." '377
1. Justice Souter's Views
Justice Souter attempts to substantiate Justice Stevens' claims. He concedes
that if there "were an excuse for giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause,
it would probably apply here. ' 378 But, "there is no excuse [as].... Constitutional
limitations are placed on government to preserve constitutional values in hard
cases, like these." '379 In his lengthy dissent, Justice Souter defends a form of
constitutional uniformity and consistency. Whether consistency or uniformity are
to be commended as part of a decision of principle, and whether judges are
"commanded to do so by a norm of political morality [that] Dworkin calls
'integrity, ' -.. is a subject beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that
not all legal commentators accept "that consistency across judicial decisions is
a good in itself."38' Few areas of constitutional decision-making can be so
characterized by confusion and disorder as Establishment jurisprudence, which
has'simply developed through "the process of constitutional litigation ...
Because the process of constitutional litigation consists of case-by-case
adjudication of specific issues, it is not a process that readily lends itself to the
development of a comprehensive underlying theory or broad, general
propositions."382
Nevertheless, Justice Souter argues for the settled nature of the so-called
"modem era of establishment doctrine," '383 which ostensibly signifies that "[n]o
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion." '84 He maintains that the Court cannot consistently
leave Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing 85 on the books and approve the
Ohio Pilot Project. 6 He contends that Everson commenced the modem era of
Establishment doctrine by holding that "no tax in any amount... can be levied
377. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
379. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
380. See Christopher J. Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled
Adjudication, 8 LEGAL THEORY 185, 185 (2002).
381. Id. at 186.
382. Sedler, supra note 6, at 1323.
383. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
384. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330
U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
385. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
386. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to support any religious activities or institutions." ' Yet he admits that a divided
Court, twenty years after Everson, "upheld a New York law authorizing local
school boards to lend textbooks in secular subjects to children attending religious
schools."3 ' The Justices were nonetheless able to transcend their differences
through
consistency in the way the Justices went about deciding the case....
Neither side rested on any facile application of the "test" or any
simplistic reliance on the generality or evenhandedness of the state
law. Disagreement concentrated on the true intent inferrable behind
the law, the feasibility of distinguishing in fact between religious and
secular teaching in church schools, and the reality or sham of lending
books to pupils instead of supplying books to schools.... The stress
was on the practical significance of the actual benefits received by the
schools.389
It remains doubtful that the purported unbreakable separation between church
and state that Justice Souter traces to Everson is sustainable if one scrutinizes the
record of government involvement and support of private religious institutions
since that case was decided." Indeed, Justice Souter plainly contradicts
Everson, which "upheld public reimbursement to parents for the expense of
bussing their children both to public schools and to Catholic parochial
schools."39'
Despite the apparent value of Everson, Justice Souter now insists that the
pertinent cases can be broken down into four categories.392 The current and
387. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 690 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968)).
389. Id. at 691 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S 793,
876 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). Justice Souter asserts that taxpayer
funding of religious institutions has "already sparked political conflicts with opponents
of public funding." Id. at 690 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson, 330 U.S. 1). This
is a rather frail argument unless unanimity is the standard for analyzing political conflict.
390. See supra Part IV.C (Justice O'Connor & Martha Minow's observations).
391. Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause andAid to Parochial Schools, 56
CAL. L. REv. 260, 261-62 (1968).
392. The first three categories include: (1) the period from 1947-1968 sustaining
the notion that no aid through school benefits were allowable; (2) "[t]hereafter for some
15 years, the Court [attempted] to draw a line against aid that would be divertible to
support the religious, as distinct from the secular, activity of an institutional beneficiary";
and then (3) commencing in 1983 the concern over divertibility gave way to "approving
aid in amounts unlikely to afford substantial benefits to religious schools, when offered
evenhandedly without regard to a recipient's religious character, and when channeled to
a religious institution only by the genuinely free choice of some private individual."
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fourth stage is subjected to stinging criticism. This stage is one in which the
substantiality of government aid has "no constitutional significance, and the
espoused criteria of neutrality in offering aid, and private choice in directing it,
are" nothing less than an example of verbal formalism. 9 It would seem that we
have descended from a realistic assessment of proposed government aid, with the
objective of adherence to the principle that no aid reach religious institutions, to
a mostly formalistic inquiry that fails to do justice to the actual facts." 4 The
procession down this boulevard led inexorably to "cases emphasizing the form
of neutrality and private choice over the substance of aid to religious uses, but
always in circumstances where any aid to religion was isolated and
insubstantial."395 In disagreeing with the Court's assessment in Zobrest and
Witters, which "involved one student's choice to spend funds from a general
public program at a religious school," '396 Justice Souter concentrates on neither
the asserted beneficiary (disabled students) nor the program at issue. Instead,
Justice Souter plainly concentrates on the effect that the exercise of private,
voluntary choice has on the indirect and even incidental beneficiary39 7-the
religious institution. In his view, even if the aid to private religious institutions
is non-substantial, the program likely violates the Establishment Clause because
even non-substantial aid advances religion.
a. Neutrality?
The "majority's twin standards of neutrality and free choice ... cannot
convincingly legitimize the Ohio scheme."'39 First, neutrality means
"evenhandedness toward aid recipients." '399 Thus, if the scheme at issue provides
different levels of assistance depending on the ultimate recipient of aid, then the
scheme becomes doubtful. Justice Souter implies that "the voucher provisions,
allowing for as much as $2,250 toward private school tuition (or a grant to a
public school in an adjacent district), were written in a way that skewed the
scheme toward benefiting religious schools."400 The neutrality of the Ohio
Zelman, 536 U.S at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 688-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
394. See id. at 693 (Souter, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 694 (Souter, J., dissenting).
396. Id. at 695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
397. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 878-79 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
398. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 695-96 (Souter, J., dissenting). This contention may be
consistent with Robert Sedler's view that the Establishment Clause's overriding principle
of neutrality rarely determines the outcome of the case. See Sedler, supra note 6, at
1340-41.
399. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
400. Id. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2003]
57
Hutchison: Hutchison: Liberal Hegemony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
program is not determined by the fact "that the better part of total state
educational expenditure goes to public schools.""4 1 On the contrary, since public
school students are only eligible for tutorial assistance of less than $400, while
voucher recipients receive up to $2,250, a sum which may be available to both
religious and nonreligious private schools, the program, afortiori, favors private,
and therefore largely religious, schools. Such a program cannot be seen as
neutral.
An objective examination of the facts implies that this claim is
falsifiable-at least on one level. Justice Souter snubs the more than $4,000 the
state provides per pupil for Cleveland students who choose to attend public
schools. Indeed, if Justice Souter's claim is correct, the State of Ohio could
effortlessly demonstrate neutrality by withdrawing all direct aid to public schools
and replacing it with a system of equal vouchers for use in both public and
private schools directed by parental choice. This evenhanded alternative might
reduce public funding of public schools. On another level, Justice Souter is
absolutely correct. The existing Pilot Project is not neutral in the amount of
monies provided for students at private and public institutions. Thus, if the term
"private school" effectively signifies a religious one, as he evidently believes,
then he is right to argue that the program is not neutral, because it discriminates
against students of religious schools in favor of those in secular or public ones.
But that is not his argument-he maintains that vouchers are simply a more
generous scheme." 2 In effect, Justice Souter's conception of neutrality requires
the state to be neutral against religious institutions.0 3
b. Free Choice Versus Coercion?
Justice Souter states that the "majority addresses the issue of choice the
same way it addresses neutrality, by asking whether recipients or potential
recipients of voucher aid have a choice of public schools among secular
alternatives to religious schools."40 4 This is the wrong question. The correct
question is "whether the private hand is genuinely free to send the money in
either a secular direction or a religious one."4 This formulation ignores the fact
that parents are free to receive a full voucher ($2,250), which can be used at
adjacent public schools in addition to the full amount of per pupil state funding
401. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
402. See id. at 698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
403. It is possible that "a doctrine of religious freedom must be neutral to
background beliefs, but background beliefs are necessarily already at work in any
doctrine of religious freedom.... [thus] 'the quest for neutrality... is an attempt to
grasp an illusion."' OWEN, supra note 126, at 7.
404. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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attributable to each additional student.4"6 Parents are also free to send their
children to magnet schools, which receive $7,097 in state aid, or community
schools, which receive $4,518 in state funding.40 7 Justice Souter contends that,
no matter how many alternatives exist, if the majority of private school
alternatives are religious, then choice cannot be "true or real or genuine. In
fact, "even a genuine choice criterion is [not] up to the task of the Establishment
Clause when substantial state funds go to religious teaching;"4 9 but even
assuming arguendo that it is, it fails utterly here because 96.6% of all voucher
recipients go to religious schools.4 10 "Choice" is not as it seems, but merely an
illusion grounded in state-sponsored coercion, 41' because: (1) almost two-thirds
of the families using vouchers to send their children to religious schools did not
embrace the religion of those schools,4 12 (2) most families made it clear that "they
had not chosen the schools because they wished their children to be proselytized
in a religion not their own, 41 3 (3) parents chose these religious schools because
of enhanced educational opportunity 41 4 and (4) it is true that "[f]or the
overwhelming number of children in the voucher scheme, the only alternative to
the public schools is religious. 4 15
c. Compelled Religious Funding and Other Objections
Having dispensed with "choice" as a criterion in an electrifying and
ultimately disappointing analysis, Justice Souter takes his dissent up a notch.
First, the substantial aid criterion precludes the program.416 Second, the decision
to uphold the Pilot Project was in "defiance of every objective supposed to be
served by the bar against establishment. '417 Taking up the magnitude of the aid
offered by the program, Justice Souter states that "'it would simply ignore reality
to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly
religious role' as the object of aid.., comes in 'substantial amounts.' 418 Thus
406. Id. at 645. As yet, no adjacent public schools have participated in the Pilot
Project. Id. at 647.
407. Id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
408. Id. at 701-02 (Souter, J., dissenting).
409. Id. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting).
410. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 707 (Souter, J., dissenting). Since most alternative schools are religious
the resulting "choice" is simply a matter of coercion. Seeid. (Souter, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
413. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
414. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
415. Id. at 707 (Souter, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting).
417. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the amount of aid, $8.2 million per year in voucher assistance coupled with
additional assistance available to private schools in the form of funds for
textbooks, reading and math tutors" 9 and other expenses, suggests a wide scope
within which "substantial amounts of tax money are . . . systematically
underwriting religious practice and indoctrination. ' 420 However, he evidently
ignores beliefs that are attached to the existing public school system unless they
are expressed in theistic language.42'
d. Saving "Private" Religion From Its Own Corruption
Saving religion from its own corruption in the form of money and regulation
is surely an important task. Whether that is the task of the Constitution is
debatable. Justice Souter, however, is indisputably correct when he notes that the
Pilot Project's regulations preclude religious schools from discriminating on the
basis of religion and thus "may not give admission preferences to children who
are members of the patron faith. ''422 It is possible that "a participating religious
school may well be forbidden to choose a member of its own clergy to serve as
teacher or principal over a layperson of a different religion claiming equal
qualification for the job.423 These prohibitions bring into play Stephen Carter's
admonition "that religious freedom is nothing if it is not the freedom to be
different. The different meanings of life that religions at their best supply
translate into different ways of living-in short, into diversity-if the state allows
believers sufficient space."424 Doubtlessly, there is little conflict with the liberal
theory embedded in educational bureaucracies, posed by those faith traditions,
religious or not, which surrender to the pull of the world.425 On the other hand,
those that exercise the "power of resistance, . . . those who insist on teaching
different meanings from those imposed by the state, even in the face of public
disapproval,"4 26 constitute a subversive challenge to the state while perhaps
providing both instrumental and normative benefits to disenfranchised outsiders.
The distribution of money, as Justice Souter rightly intimates, has a
potentially adverse effect on the plausible benefits of educational
experimentation. If the State of Ohio is looking to private schools to provide
curricular alternatives for profoundly disadvantaged pupils, public money may
perversely discourage it. In light of the fact that "money has barely begun to
419. Id. at 709 (Souter, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 711-12 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.C.4.
422. Id. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 712-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
424. Carter, supra note 64, at 36.
425. See Carter, supra note 64, at 35.
426. Carter, supra note 64, at 35.
[Vol. 68
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/2
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
flow," '427 this point is particularly relevant given both the number of religious
institutions offering educational alternatives and the diversity of practice
grounded in the differing ideas about "community" that they bring to the table.
"[W]hen government aid goes up, so does reliance on it; the only thing likely to
go down is independence."428 When will dependence "become great enough to
give the State of Ohio an effective veto over basic decisions on the content of the
curriculums, 429 like its current control over decisions taken by public schools
today? This is a serious question. It is doubtful that the Pilot Project provides
a comprehensive answer.
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent broods disconsolately over "the risk that publicly
financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict."43
He provides an explication of the claim that the provision of school vouchers is
simply a recipe for potential social conflict,43 while admitting that "Great Britain
and France have in the past reconciled religious school funding and religious
freedom without creating serious strife." '432 He begins by quoting both the
constitutional admonition that "'Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion,' and a guarantee[] that the government shall not
prohibit 'the free exercise thereof."' 433 Justice Breyer states, "These Clauses
embody an understanding, reached in the [seventeenth century] after decades of
religious war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that
respects the religious views of all citizens, permits those citizensto 'worship God
in their own way,' and allows all families to 'teach their children and to form
their characters' as they wish." '434 A fair commitment to this Lockean and
Baylean outlook43 suggests support for parental liberty.436 But Justice Breyer,
427. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 714 (Souter, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting).
429. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at. 718-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
432. Id. at 725 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
433. Id. at 717-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
434. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting C. RADCLIFFE, THE LAW & ITS COMPASS
71(1960)).
435. See, e.g., A. J. Conyers, Rescuing Tolerance, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2001,
at 43, 43-44 (discussing John Locke and Pierre Bayle's conception of tolerance),
available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0 08/articles/conyers.html.
436. See, e.g., Schaub, supra note 136, at 47 ("In his educational treatise, Some
Thoughts Concerning Education, he [Locke] recommends that children be kept as much
as possible in the company of their parents."). Evidently "[n]either Locke nor Bayle was
a secular humanist in the sense intended by revisionist historiography. Both were deeply
religious Christians, who argued for universal toleration as the expression of respect for
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inconsistent with the historical record of both the founding of the country and
seventy years of subsequent American experience, disagrees.
Admittedly, Justice Breyer, echoing Justice Souter, writes eloquently about
the "anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious
groups struggl[e] with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of
approval." 7 He cites with both approval and passion Lemon v. Kurtzman's
explanation that "political debate and division . . . are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which [the First
Amendment's religion clauses were] ... intended to protect."438 Yet he fails to
grapple with an important possibility explicated by The Federalist: various
pathologies emerge from majoritarian democracies.439 These pathologies
inevitably lead to conflict. Thus, it is right to be concerned about divisiveness or
the exacerbation of tension, but it is a mistake to suggest that its prime, or only
source is religious. Justice Breyer, like most Americans, seems to "have
confidence in [the history of] majoritarian democracy, but that confidence runs
counter to the lessons of history."" Democracy, evidently, "cannot exist as a
permanent form of government. It can only exist until a majority of voters
discover that they can vote themselves largess out of the public treasury.""' It
is doubtful that only voters who wish to take advantage of the opportunity to send
their children to private, even religious, schools have discovered this
possibility."'
the inalienable right to conscience; that respect was, in their view, necessary to purify
religious belief of its corruption by the state coercion of established churches and, at the
same time, to make possible an independent and practical sense of ethics." DAvID A. J.
RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 118-19 (1986).
437. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
438. Id. at 719 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971)).
439. See, e.g., Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 25-26.
440. Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 26.
441. Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 26.
442. "Public choice theory... has cast doubt in various ways on the coherence and
efficacy of collective decision making. In particular, public choice theory has shown that
cohesive groups, called special interests, may be able to exercise political power out of
proportion to their numbers to obtain resources and status for themselves." McGinnis,
supra note 259, at 503. This observation likely applies to the countless number of special
interest groups who wish to capture the public school monopoly for their purposes.
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V. TOWARD AN OUTSIDER-PREMISED-FAIRNESS ANALYSIS OF THE
TERMS OF THE ZELMAN DEBATE
The blues is a music about human will and human frailty, just as the
brilliance of the Constitution is that it recognizes grand human
possibility with the same clarity that it does human frailty, which is
why I say it has a tragic base. Just as the blues assumes that any man
or any woman can be unfaithful, the Constitution assumes that nothing
is lasting-nothing, that is, other than the perpetual danger of abused
power." 3
When Justice Stevens poses this question: "Is a law that authorizes the use
of public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of grammar school
children in particular religious faiths a 'law respecting the establishment of
religion;"'"'4 when Justice Souter states that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or
small can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions;""' 5 when
Justice Breyer's concerns over religiously-based social conflict and the threat to
the Nation's social fabric compel the invalidation of the Pilot Projects; 6 when
Justice Thomas argues, "one of the purposes of public schools was to promote
democracy and a more egalitarian culture ... [and] public education [may be] 'a
matter of personal liberation and a necessary function of a free society;' 447 and
when the Court asserts, "Program benefits are available to participating families
on neutral terms with no [p]reference to religion,"" 8 when in fact the State of
Ohio provides private schools with fewer resources than comparable public
schools, then Establishment Clause exegesis may supply short shrift to the
interests of outsiders in any educational experimentation that may benefit their
children. Although any attempt to uncover fully the values of the Zelman Court
may be condemned to failure, it seems clear that both wings of the Court, and in
particular, the dissenting opinions, provide a mystifying array of claims,
counterclaims and statements that while robustly argued, are primarily pretext for
a decision that represents a foregone conclusion. The pertinent claims can be
organized thematically in these three categories: (A) defending democracy by
defending the centralizing function of public schools; (B) vouchers as a form of
443. CROUCH, supra note 189, at 10.
444. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 684 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
445. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing,
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
446. Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
447. Id. at 681-82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting JAMES D. ANDERSON,
EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 18 (1988)).
448. Id. at 653.
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compelled funding of religious indoctrination; and (C) government endorsement
of religion.
A. Defending Democracy by Defending the Centralizing Function of
Public Schools
Some members of the Court evince support for the claim that a largely
public education is necessary for the preservation of both democracy and social
harmony. As we have seen, both the dissent" 9 and the concurrence45 ° are drawn
to such views. This stance, apparently against Herder's preference for actual
diversity of views,45 is congruent with the republican notion that requiring a
"common culture serves as the background against which rational deliberation
can take place." '452 As thus conceived, endorsing and then mandating a
"[c]ommon culture is the act of assimilation itself.... The choice to be American
is a large part of the glue that holds society together." '453 Evidently, compelling
a centralized version of culture is critical to the deliberation of citizens and our
own cultural tradition, and must be given presumptive authority.454 This
contention should be qualified. First, Western universalism, when confronted
with global cultural diversity, tends to respond with imperialism.455 Although
that conclusion may not fully apply to a nation state like the United States for
several reasons, it is probable that the subordination of outsiders is sustained by
(1) mandatory injections of culture that are inescapably attached to the liberal
order and its exclusionary history in the form of the public schools when
accompanied by compulsory school attendance requirements, and (2) the
exclusion of alternative forms of educational experimentation. Second, while it
may be true that the "interpretation of human action often requires a background
theory of the cultural conventions that shape our consciousness, including law
and... language,"456 as Terry Eagleton illumines,
"Culture" is said to be one of the two or three most complex words in
the English language ...... "Culture" at first denoted a thoroughly
449. Id. at 717-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
451. See, e.g., FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 33, at 9 ("From the beginning or, to be
more precise, from the time of Plato to that of Voltaire, human diversity was judged in
the court of fixed values. Then came Herder, who turned things around. He had
universal values [culture] condemned in the court of diversity.").
452. Sherry, supra note 9, at 163.
453. Sherry, supra note 9, at 163.
454. Sherry, supra note 9, at 164.
455. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 318 (1996).
456. RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 22.
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material process, which was then metaphorically transposed to affairs
of the spirit. The word thus charts within its semantic unfolding
humanity's own historic shift from rural to urban existence.4 57
Thus, culture, however defined, may have several different meanings.
Whatever our common culture is, it evidently must be imposed on all other
cultures currently present within the American population.458 But such an
imposed ethos, as an "[intimation] of shared meanings.., divined by prophetic
or traditionalist avatars of the spirit of the people, [is] never checked against
actual opinions, least of all those of the most disadvantaged... people." 59 For
Suzanna Sherry, our common culture consists of a "common commitment to the
political idea and values contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and
elaborated by those (like Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther
King, Jr.) who have extended and articulated the definition of our civic culture
in each generation."46 While no convincing basis is offered to determine who,
what and how our purportedly common culture is to be attained in the future, or
how such a culture was attained in the past, it is apparent that liberal iconography
is assigned a lead role in this current and forthcoming liberal/republican world.4"'
Consistent with this outlook, religious strife presumably vitiates "our common
culture" and its homogenetic ally-public schools.
Justice Stevens, like Justices Breyer and Souter, avers that his Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and antagonism to vouchers is grounded in his concern for
the possibility of religious strife.462 Plainly, this appeal to empirical and
consequentialist considerations, in the capable hands of Charles Taylor, might
reflect the nuanced deliberation that "[o]ur understanding of the place of religion
in a free society is bedeviled by our different understandings of freedom,""' 3 and
that while God may no longer be inescapable, that does not mean that we live in
a society from which God has been expelled. ' In the hands of less skilled
457. TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 1 (2000).
458. Sherry, supra note 9, at 165-66.
459. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 115 (1990).
460. Sherry, supra note 9, at 165-66.
461. Some proponents ofthe homogenized view imply that to "argue for a common
cultureis not to propose an exclusionary [one]." Sherry, supra note 9, at 166. But it is
likely the fate of liberal political theory within the United States to be attached to an
exclusionary history in the past and to ensure an exclusionary future.
462. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
463. Charles Taylor, Religion in a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES
OF PEACE, supra note 33, at 93, 94.
464. Bruce Ellis Benson, What It Means To Be Secular: A Conversation With
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observers, such concerns are often not only superficial, but profoundly deficient
in several ways. First, such claims discount a good. deal of history which
suggests that many people migrated to what is now the United States in order to
create distinct religious communities, which sought to, and often did exclude
others. Moreover, such indictments discard the evidence that "the secular
ideological wars of the twentieth century killed far more people than all the
religious wars of history combined,'4 65 namely, the nearly sixty-one million
deaths produced by the Soviet Union's imposition of communism (an apparently
nonreligious faith) as well as the nearly twenty million killed by the Nazis. 66
Even so, "secular ideologies are not banned from the liberal public square
because of their dangers. 467
The death camps in the Soviet Gulag or at Treblinka were neither grounded
in contemporary or ancient theological disputes, nor disputes about the veracity
of rival conceptions of eschatological hermeneutics. Rather, they were grounded
in class, ideology and race. Evidently, Nietzche, who hastened the creation of
post-modem society and embraced the death of God in modem and post-modem
culture, correctly anticipated democide4 6' and other evils. "If God is dead, then
man has completely lost his orientation. There is no human dignity, no equality,
no rights, no democracy, no liberalism and no good and evil. '469 Thus, modem
liberal thinkers such as Marx and others appear "extraordinarily superficial,
railing against religion on the one hand while remaining firmly attached to ideals
of justice and equality on the other.... [I]f God is dead, then nothing at all can
be taken for granted-and absolutely everything is permitted, 470 including the
state imposition of meaning. The concentration on religious conflict ignores,
either unconsciously or deliberately, the fact that twentieth century strife,
however deplorable, is largely derived not from a religious viewpoint per se, but
from the need to impose particular views. It is possible that even the need to
impose particular views may be historically and emotionally linked to the
Enlightenment and its modem and post-modem heirs, even if "the liberal
465. Carter, supra note 64, at 52.
466. See, e.g., R.J. Rummel, How Many Did Communist Regimes Murder? (Nov.
1993) (unpublished essay), available at
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/COM.ART.HTM and
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0598commurder.htm.
467. Carter, supra note 64, at 52.
468. See e.g., Rummel, supra note 466, at 1. Democide "means for governments
what murder means for an individual under municipal law. It is the premeditated killing
of a person in cold blood, or causing the death of a person through reckless and wanton
disregard for their life." Rummel, supra note 466, at 1.
469. Damon Linker, Nietzsche's Truth, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2002, at 50, 54
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Enlightenment model of the autonomous self has lost much of its hold on current
thinking, [and has been] displaced by an antifoundational and largely
Nietzschean postmodemism."47
The second analytic deficiency associated with the contention that strife will
rise and democracy diminish if the government funds school choice is derived
from the understanding that some opponents of vouchers adhere to a centralized
conception of democracy, with its centralized view of how to produce social
norms. This conception overlooks other "constitutive structures that provide
alternate mechanisms of [social norm] production." '472 The voucher wrangle
likely reflects a contest between a social order constructed from below, in the
form of spontaneous exchange, as against a stability imposed by the government
from above.473 The centralized state, when confronted with disparate conceptions
of the good, fearful of any real or imagined strife which could emerge in the
absence of a strong sovereign, enters the fray to preclude a Hobbesian state of
nature by "protect[ing] the individual from brutish forces to which he would be
subjected without the protection of the state."474 Thus, when private religious
schools grew during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, importing teachers
from the Old Country, teaching students in German, Polish, Italian or Czech,4
such a movement "posed a particular threat to a cherished agent of social equality
and acculturation-the common school movement. 476
Perforce, "[t]he majoritarian structure of [public] schooling, by requiring the
attempt at coercive consensus, inevitably violates freedom of belief and
expression; but the combatants in these conflicts have refused to recognize this
contradiction. '477 This attempt to elevate social conformity as America's highest
value is incompatible with the "notion of a vibrant culturally diverse nation. 478
This conclusion is consistent with the intuition that "[r]acial minorities, along
with the nonwealthy, constitute the group most systematically deprived of liberty
471. Elizabeth Mensch, Christianity and the Roots of Liberalism, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 54, at 55, 72.
472. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 259, at 496.
473. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 527-59.
474. Robert B. Everhart, Introduction to THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY, supra
note 128, at 7.
475. Woodhouse, supra note 214, at 1005.
476. Woodhouse, supra note 214, at 1005.
477. ARONS, supra note 24, at 74. Conversely and confusingly, Sherry contends
that the claim that "there is no common culture is a version of the broader philosophical
claim... that truth is subjective and reality constructed." Sherry, supra note 9, at 167.
She argues that this claim is evidently attached to cultural relativism and highly
contingent conceptions of reality. Sherry, supra note 9, at 167. Yet, as any student of
history and truth can tells us, even democracy is a highly contingent reality as evidenced
by its rarity and all too frequent demise.
478. MCAFEE, supra note 66, at 37.
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in schooling under current conditions." '479 Nevertheless, while "[m]odem
educators argue that state intervention was, and remains, necessary in order to
unify American society,"48 and even though it is consistently asserted that
"government schooling has been key to bringing together various racial,
religious, and political groups... based on the experiences of the 1800s [and
contemporary America, these beliefs are] not only wrong but .. .exactly
backwards."48' "When government imposes the content of schooling it becomes
the same deadening agent of repression from which the Framers of the
Constitution sought to free themselves."4 2 Properly understood, the invocation
of strife reduction as a component of the dissent's formalistic conception of the
Establishment Clause creates a bulwark against educational innovation and
affirms a predisposition favoring centralized public education as the appropriate
strife management vehicle. This commitment plainly disregards Justice Black's
opinion in Everson, which held that the "[First] Amendment requires the state to
be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary." '483 Nonetheless, the dissent
remains an unwaveringly committed adversary to educational innovation that
favors African-Americans when, and if, religious schools are part of a
comprehensive framework.
The third deficiency associated with the dissent's perspective is the absence
of historical or international evidence that strife will necessarily be enhanced or
that democracy will likely be vitiated by public support of independent
religiously affiliated educational institutions, especially when funding occurs via
individual choice. On the contrary, both historical and contemporary
international evidence refutes these claims. For example, it has been
demonstrated that classical Athens, perhaps the "most democratic state in history
prior to the foundation of the [United States] republic did not require democracy
or anything else to be taught in its schools."4 4 Indeed, "it did not require the
existence of schools."4 85 Although Athens "was plagued by some of the same
social blights that have afflicted modem nations ... [the] freedom extended to
education, and permitt[ed] families complete discretion over their children's
schooling. Government played no role in the funding, regulation, or provision
of education.... Independent elementary schools were created in response to
public demand."486 On the other hand, Sparta, Athens' chief rival during its
479. ARONS, supra note 24, at 218.
480. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
481. Brouillette, supra note 8, at 10.
482. ARONS, supra note 24, at 190.
483. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (cited in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
484. Coulson, supra note 120, at 61.
485. Coulson, supra note 120, at 61.
486. Coulson, supra note 120, at 61.
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golden age, deployed schools as a force for minimizing dissension and enforcing
"harmony" among the citizenry.487 Unlike Athens, where virtually every aspect
of child-rearing was the right and responsibility of parents, in Sparta, it was the
prerogative of the government.4 8 Evidently, "all the male children ... were
separated from their families and taken to live in school dormitories .... Parents
had no direct say in the education or upbringing of their children, having to cede
their responsibilities and desires to this single, monolithic state system."48 9 This
approach had its advantages. "Sparta's brutal state school system did produce a
very effective military, and its totalitarian ability to homogenize children kept
dissention within the populace to a minimum.., at the expense of virtually every
human freedom we take for granted today."49 The disparate experiences of
Athens and Sparta demonstrate that democracy can be compatible with
educational freedom and state control over education can be compatible with a
form of homogenization born of totalitarianism.
Moreover, in 1917 the Netherlands "enacted a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing full-blown choice. Any responsible group, public or private, is
guaranteed the right to private education."49 Significantly, "[d]iscrimination in
funding is precluded. Public schools and private schools are treated equally with
regard to funding ... [and in] regulating private schools, 'due regard must be
paid to their own freedom in accordance with their religious beliefs." 492 As a
consequence, although nearly seventy percent of Dutch children attended public
schools in 1920, today more than seventy percent attend private schools.493
Apparently, neither harmony nor democracy has been diminished by government
funded school choice.494
Furthermore, it is clear that contemporary American religious institutions
have consistently and regularly received funds in very substantial amounts
without restrictions on subsequent use ,4" and without producing strife or vitiating
democracy.496 As Choper makes obvious, federal and state funds were "being
487. Coulson, supra note 120, at 61.
488. Coulson, supra note 120, at 61.
489. Coulson, supra note 120, at 62-63.
490. Coulson, supra note 120, at 63.
491. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 68.
492. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 68.
493. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 68.
494. An additional inference may plausibly be drawn from the Canadian experience
with a putatively public school system coexisting peaceably along with a Catholic School
system for more than 100 years without provoking strife.
495. See supra Part IV.C; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 693,666-
68 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Religious hospitals, which account for eighteen
percent of all hospital beds nationwide, rely on Medicare funds for thirty-six percent of
their revenues.).
496. See supra Part IV.C (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence).
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allocated [as far back as 1948], in no less than 350 instances, to American
parochial schools.... And it is reasonable to assume that increased public
concern with education has caused that number to grow significantly.
497
Conversely, as we have seen, private schools, including religious ones,
affirmatively reduce racial, ethnic and economic stratification through improved
voluntary integration, and enhance educational achievement, thus diminishing
economic disparity between outsiders and majority groups. The result in itself
diminishes degradation in the form of stigmatization by which the "dominant
group in society differentiates itself from others by setting them apart, treating
them as less than fully human, .... and excluding them from participating in that
community as equals."498
Nevertheless, many commentators and judges have been taken with the
apparently utilitarian claims that "vouchers pose a serious threat to values that are
vital to the health of American democracy [and that] [t]hese programs subvert the
constitutional principle of separation of church and state."499 This contention,
whether bounded by what the Constitution says or by Dworkin's interpretive
theory of what he and they might wish it to say, 00 is often associated with the
speculative necessity of eliminating strife, and forms a major component of the
"neither inhibiting or advancing religion" strand of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Any reasoned evaluation of this claim must note its haunting
similarity to an earlier charge: the largely indefensible claim that vouchers
contribute to racial division. Both claims are stranded by the absence of
empirical evidence. Indeed, Lawrence Tribe cites Nyquist with approval for the
proposition that the prospect of division "may not alone warrant the invalidation
of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decision
of the Court." '' A comprehensive inspection of the corpus of evidence
obtainable demonstrates that this often self-congratulatory "division and social
stratification" claim, in the hands of the dissent, either animating or grounded in
opposition to school choice, is simply a predisposition that is calculated to shield
public education from the alternatives. Taken together or individually these
various and related charges expose as irrational this component of the terms of
the voucher debate. Such irrationality "can inspire human beings to harm
497. Choper, supra note 391, at 262.
498. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 350.
499. Anti-Defamation League, School Vouchers: The Wrong Choice for Public
Education, available at http://www.adl.org.
500. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
17 (1991) (Dworkin adopts an apparently open perspective that suggests the Constitution
should be interpreted as the best Constitution in accord with what the interpreter's larger
vision of what the Constitution should be like.).
501. TRIBE, supra note 307, at 868 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973)).
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themselves and others."5"2 The dogmatism associated with an overarching
commitment to public education and the exclusion of public support for private
education is justified on grounds that a reasoned examination demolishes.
Properly understood, the choice movement, including home schooling, "is not
some sort of militia movement. . .-a radical withdrawal of the disaffected-but
rather a first step toward the reconstitution of civil society."50 3 Therefore,
agitation about the alleged destructive effect that vouchers might have on
America's democratic ethos is largely a self-serving exaggeration." 4 Contrary
to both the Zelman dissent and much current commentary, the contemporary
evidence suggests that for a number of reasons private schools do a much better
job than public schools in educating pupils for citizenship. 5 '
A comprehensive and culturally informed inspection of the historical and
sociological evidence demonstrates that the purported neutrality of public schools
and the purported contribution of public schools to harmonized democracy have
inescapably been fused, ironically enough with racist oppression and apartheid-
like exclusion, and thus contribute to social stratification and separation. This
fusion of horizons.0 6 predictably fails to educate students for a defensible form
of citizenship that refrains from compelling belief. If the Supreme Court ignores
the quantum of evidence available, reasonable observers may be compelled to
conclude that the reification of public schools and the denial of funds to largely
African-American and Hispanic outsiders for alternative forms of education may
well be linked to unconscious racism. In light of the overwhelming evidence of
the disproportionately adverse effects of the public education paradigm on
outsiders, both the Court and the commentators should be aware of these effects.
The urge to invalidate school choice on implausible grounds effectively
constitutes a decision to preserve the racially stigmatizing effects of public
schools for future generations. Accordingly, the reformist contention that we
should evaluate the effects of policies and not simply the asserted intent, neutral
or otherwise, reveals that the liberal wing's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
fails to place the concern for fairness to outsider groups at the center of this
debate-instead such concerns are deemed irrelevant.0 7 Thus, when examining
502. Yack, supra note 117, at 2 (summarizing Shklar).
503. Schaub, supra note 136, at 50.
504. Rosen, supra note 18, at 8.
505. Rosen, supra note 18, at 8.
506. My debt to Hans Georg Gadamer should be obvious. See, e.g., Michael
Zuckert, John Rawls, Historian, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS, Fall 2002, at 23, 24,
available at http://www.claremont.org/writings/crb/fall2002/zuckertrawls.html.
507. It maybe that the liberal wing of the Court takes it as background justification
some form of utilitarianism which has as its goal the fulfillment of as many preferences
of as many citizens as possible. Therefore the preferences of outsiders are outweighed
by the desires and preferences of the majority. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153-54 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
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putatively neutral institutions and putatively dispassionate Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, CRT and reformist methodology are capable of finding racism and
superordination already there.
B. Vouchers as a Form of Compulsory Funding of Indoctrination?
John McGinnis, rather optimistically, insists that the United States Supreme
Court has recently been taken with
a jurisprudence of social discovery..'. [that] allows religious ideas on
character-building and other social norms to compete with secular
ideas and norms. In making the issue of coercion turn on parents
rather than children, the Court treats parents as the relevant decision
makers and, as elsewhere in current jurisprudence, strengthens the
nuclear family as a constitutionally protected association." 8
If true, school vouchers may continue to find protection while providing a space
in which religious norms and values can compete against centrally imposed state
sponsored norms. °9 Similarly, the Rosenberger Court reinforced the conclusion
that "religious associations enjoy the opportunity to apply for funds that the
government makes available to secular organizations for expressive purposes.""'°
The Court held that refusing to fund a "magazine because of its religious content
was impermissible viewpoint discrimination." '' The Supreme Court "rejected
the argument that the university had avoided viewpoint discrimination by
excluding the whole subject matter of religion and not picking and choosing
among different religions." ' 2 But it is precisely that kind of discrimination
which can skew the debate." 3 Thus, the Court wrote:
Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of public
discourse has not embraced such a contrived description of the
marketplace of ideas.... It is as objectionable to exclude both a
theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude
one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social
viewpoint." 4
508. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553.
509. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 549-50.
510. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553.
511. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553.
512. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553.
513. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553.
514. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 831-32 (1995).
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Thus, John McGinnis maintains, "The Court's conclusion in this regard is
absolutely crucial if religiously backed norms are to compete with secular norms
in the modem world."5 5 While this perspective may yet prove accurate, and
while Rosenberger's requirement that sectarian institutions have access to
government funds on equal footing with secular institutions"6 is an attractive
paradigm, it is far from obvious that the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of
either wing of the Court is completely open to any educational experimentation
that may benefit outsider groups.517 To do so would effectively mean that
government can no longer disfavor norm production attached to religious
educational institutions. Instead, aid would be available on a basis that favors
no one.
By contrast, Justice Souter, in his search for the Founders' intent, reminds
us that Jefferson concluded it is objectionable on freedom of conscience grounds
for anyone to be "compelled to... support any religious worship, place or
ministry whatsoever."51 Thus, one possible conception of the original intent of
the Founders implies that they were committed to a "no-aid" rule and a strict
separation between the state and religion." 9 While any reliance on Jefferson as
a Founder is questionable,520 it is equally true that Jefferson determined that "to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.""52 That language could be taken
515. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 554.
516. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 259, at 554.
517. Recall the majority of the Court overlooked the Pilot Project's explicit
preference for public education in the form of a disparity in funding that favors public
schools. See supra Part IV.B.
518. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting A Bill for Establishing Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 84 (P.
Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)).
519. In reality the "First Amendment never created a wall between religion and
government, despite the prevalence of that metaphor." Minow, supra note 22, at 1086.
While Justice Souter relies on both Jefferson and Madison to buttress his separationist
position, "[b]oth the majority and the dissenters in Everson v. Board of Education...
accepted this approach, but the very fact that Justices who agreed on the [alleged]
governing principle could divide so closely on the result suggests that the principle
evoked by the image of a wall furnishes less guidance than metaphor." TRIBE, supra note
307, at 820.
520. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious
Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1585 (1989). See also infra note 535 and
accompanying text.
521. Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor
and the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
347,373 (1998) (citing THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION
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to apply to nonreligious opinions as well as religious ones;522 hence, following
Locke and Bayle, that language breathes life into a correlative right to object to
public funding of nonreligious ideas and value-laden opinions on freedom of
conscience grounds.523 Such a conception, as Choper demonstrates, is consistent
with the Establishment Clause's "paramount purpose... to safeguard freedom
of worship and conscience-in a word to protect religious liberty.""'a Moreover,
Justice Souter and the dissent's attachment to an idealistic "no-aid" standard must
be seen against the evidence that "[e]arly [American] theorists generally held that
a good society required religion and its attendant morality, so that, when they
used the term separation of church and state, they were not defending an ideal
but launching an attack on those who denied such a self-evident truth. 525
Accordingly, separation of church and state as an ideal came to America during
the nineteeth century. "But it did not come as the triumph of reason; it was
instead the product of Protestant nativism seeking to wage war against
Catholicism.
5 26
In reality, Jefferson and Madison's perspectives on Establishment Clause
concerns, which were consistent with John Locke and Pierre Bayle's conception
of religious tolerance in general, contradicted one another, and at times
contradicted themselves.527 For instance, Thomas Jefferson, reversing his earlier
opposition, permitted seminaries at the University of Virginia.2 8 Jefferson
understood that "a government that is ostensibly neutral or indifferent to
theological truth does not have a neutral effect on the theological opinions of its
522. Arguably such an approach is consistent with Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 831-32 (1995). See "also McGinnis, supra note 259, at 553-54.
523. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 89-95. "Locke and Bayle give
conscience a moral interpretation and weight associated with their conception of the
proper respect due to the highest-order interest of persons in their freedom (the
origination and revisibility of claims) and rationality (practical and epistemic
rationality)." RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 90.
524. Choper, supra note 391, at 267; see also Harry G. Hutchison, Diversity,
Tolerance, and Human Rights: The Future ofLabor Unions and the Union Dues Dispute,
49 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming March 2004) (arguing that freedom ofconscience norms
can be revitalized by inspecting international human rights).
525. Alan Wolfe, Why Separation of Church and State Is Still a Good Idea, BOOKS
& CULTURE, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 6, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2002/005/7.6.htmi.
526. Id.; see also Robert H. Bork, Getting Over the Wall, 149 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 108, 108 (2002) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (2002)) ("Philip Hamburger... demonstrates conclusively that separation of
church and state was no part of the intention underlying the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause.").
527. RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 116-128 & 159.
528. OWEN, supra note 126, at 170.
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citizens." '52 9 Indeed, Phillip Hamburger notes that Jefferson's "separation of
church" language differs significantly from the language of the First
Amendment.131 Arguments about the Founders' intent thus enjoy selective
appeal. "Justice Hugo Black... appealed to ... historical understandings when
they supported his convictions about correct interpretation of the liberal clauses
of the First Amendment, including the religion clauses; but he and the Court
abandoned such history in other areas when it did not similarly support their
views."3' Justice Souter's analysis falls prey to that same willingness to interpret
the Founders' intent selectively. While he is surely right to argue that Jefferson
found it objectionable on freedom of conscience grounds for anyone to be
compelled to support religious worship, 32 and that Madison suggested that taxing
citizens "to establish religion is antithetical to the command that the minds of
men always be wholly free," '533 this selective approach, nevertheless, constitutes
an unnecessarily crabbed conception of both Jefferson and Madison's purported
"no-aid" approach, which was aimed at a more complex conception of freedom
of conscience than Justice Souter admits. 34 Indeed, the claim that we should rely
on Jefferson to ascertain the Framers' intent is suspect, because he participated
in neither the First Constitutional Convention nor the First Congress.535
But of course there is more. In relying on James Madison, Justice Souter
overlooks Madison's conception of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, which arguably "takes the Constitution back to its historical
roots."536 This neglect is telling. Evidently, "James Madison, the drafter of the
First Amendment, saw free speech and free exercise as two sides of the same
coin: property rights that needed special protection against the state." '537 The
term "property" includes "that dominion which one man claims and exercises
529. OWEN, supra note 126, at 170.
530. HAMBURGER, supra note 525, at 2.
531. RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 122-123.
532. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,711 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
533. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
534. Justice Souter does concede that "[a]s a historical matter, the protection of
liberty of conscience may well have been the central objective served by the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 711 n.22 (Souter, J., dissenting). Apparently, for Justice
Souter, issues of conscience are not implicated if secular ethical or nontheistic values are
imposed on a populace that is unwilling to surrender its conscience to the state.
535. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 520, at 1584-85 (stating that Jefferson served
as minister to France from 1785 to 1789).
536. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 554.
537. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 554.
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over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual." 3'
Hence, on Madison's account:
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a
man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every
one else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man's land, or
merchandize, or money is called his property. In the latter sense, a
man has a property in his opinions and the free communication of
them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and
in profession and practice dictated by them. . . . Government is
instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the
various rights of individual, as that which the term particularly
expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just
government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his
own.
539
It appears that Justice Souter and his fellow dissenters have adopted a conception
of the Establishment Clause that demonstrates partiality for a perspective which
he favors, while disallowing a comprehensive Madisonian conception, which he
nevertheless claims to support.
Further mystifying this debate is the perception that "[w]hat constitutes aid
or support[] is 'obviously a sophisticated and not a simple literal concept"' 540
employed for the purposes of ascertaining government support of indoctrination.
Laurence Tribe helpfully points out that because a "'no-aid' formulation remains
indeterminate because of the obvious difficulty of specifying precisely what
constitutes 'aid,"' and because its alter-ego, strict separation fails to offer "much
guidance in determining what manner or degree of economic benefit constitutes
impermissible 'aid' to religion, the Supreme Court has increasingly sought refuge
in the elusive and variable notion of 'neutrality."'' 541 In Justice Souter's hands,
neutrality may not simply be a refuge but a weapon against both religion itself
and a broad conception of conscience that seems consistent with the intent of the
Founders. John McGinnis clarifies: "So long as the government acts neutrally
in permitting religious and nonreligious associations to participate in its
programs, the government acts constitutionally because, in Madison's words,
such a program 'leaves to everyone . . . the like advantage' in holding his
opinions and propagating his view. ' 542 "Government action for religious
538. James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1751-1836, at 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1983) (cited in McGinnis, supra note 259, at 554-55).
539. Id.
540. Choper, supra note 391, at 261.
541. TRIBE, supra note 307, at 820.
542. McGinnis, supra note 259, at 555.
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purposes is highly suspect;" '43 government programs that have a secular purpose
are not. Because the Zelman dissenters effectively concede the secular purpose
of the Pilot Project, and because "governmental action for secular purposes does
not fall within the core of the establishment clause's concern,"' " the assertion
that vouchers are a form of compulsory indoctrination becomes improbable. 45
Moreover, without solving the puzzle of neutrality and without entering into
the debate as to what constitutes a religious faith, for purposes of exclusion from
the public square, we need to determine what Justice Souter and his fellow
dissenters do not: what to make of faiths or other ethical constructs that decline
to express a belief in a theistic God. For instance, John Dunphy, writing for The
Humanist, argued:
I am convinced that the battle for humankind's future must be waged
and won in the public school classrooms by teachers who correctly
perceive their role as the proselytizers of a new faith: a religion of
humanity. . . . These teachers must embody the same selfless
dedication as the most rabid fundamentalist preachers for they will be
ministers of another sort, utilizing a classroom instead of a pulpit to
convey humanist values. 46
Paul Blanshard wrote that "the most important factor moving us toward a secular
society has been the educational factor. Our schools may not teach Johnny to
read properly, but ... school ... tends toward the elimination of religious
superstition." 47 Similarly, Professor Ray Billington believes that the concept of
God is man-made and accordingly proposes a "religion without God" based on
relationships, nature and the arts. 5" Furthermore, "some 1960s radicals... eye
the schools as their last best hope... [and are] not shy about [their] desire to use
the schools to bring about radical social change." 49  What might these
nontheistic views mean for the provision of aid and the application of law on the
subject of Establishment Clause jurisprudence? It is surely possible that the
courts could simply "articulate a constitutional double standard or apply the
functional definition of religion to the no establishment clause just as they have
543. Choper, supra note 391, at 268.
544. Choper, supra note 391, at 269.
545. The clear evidence that state aid follows the uncoerced choice of parents who
select either a public or private education for their children also buttresses this
conclusion. See supra Part IV.B.
546. John H. Dunphy, Public Education, THE HUMANIST, Jan./Feb. 1983 (cited in
Hunter, supra note 153, at 70).
547. Paul Blanshard, Three Cheers for our Secular State, THE HUMANIST,
Mar./Apr. 1976, at 17, 25 (cited in Hunter, supra note 153, at 70).
548. RAY BILLINGTON, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2002).
549. ALAN WOLFE, MARGINALIZED IN THE MIDDLE 140 (1996).
2003]
77
Hutchison: Hutchison: Liberal Hegemony
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
to the free exercise. '""' One observer implies that if the latter methodology is
chosen, it "would mean that secularistic faiths and ideologies would be rigorously
prohibited from receiving even indirect support from the state, which-needless
to say-would have enormous implications for public education."55' An
alternative approach would imply that the Free Exercise Clause "should enjoy
constitutional priority, and the traditional understanding of the Antiestablishment
Clause should give way, whenever it seriously compromises free exercise values.
For example, if antiestablishment prohibitions on state funding of parochial
school education compromise the free exercise of parents, such prohibitions
should give way." '552 Basically because of these implications, "many progressive
constitutional scholars... therefore vigorously reject consistency in favor of
a 'double standard'-a functional definition of religion for free exercise
purposes and a substantive definition for no establishment purposes.5 53
Laurence Tribe, for instance, has reasoned that, without such a double standard
"every humane government program could be 'deemed constitutionally
suspect.'"'5 4 Although such an approach seems both inconsistent with a broad
conception of both Jefferson's and Madison's views, and manifestly inconsistent
with Jefferson's decision permitting seminaries at the University of Virginia,555
when and "if the courts adopt such a double standard,, what possibly could
provide a set of fair ground rules for value-grounded debate?" 556 Although
answers are obtainable, 57 the liberal wing of the Court fails to provide any.
Hence, Justice Souter's and the liberal wing of the Court's apparent absolutism558
550. Hunter, supra note 153, at 72.
551. Hunter, supra note 153, at 72; see also SOWELL, supra note 21, at 179 ("As
public schools have increasingly become militant dispensers of indoctrination with
fashionable avant-garde attitudes, various religious individuals and groups have
objected.").
552. RICHARDS, supra note 436, at 132; see also Choper, supra note 391, at 260-
341.
553. Hunter, supra note 153, at 72.
554. Hunter, supra note 153, at 72.
555. OWEN, supra note 126, at 170.
556. Hunter, supra note 153, at 72.
557. One approach might be to accept Carter's notion that all of these disputes are
ultimately disputes between competing faiths. Accordingly, faith in science or reason
cannot claim any epistemological superiority over any religious faith, because each faith
presupposes its own epistemology-its own standard of evidence and rationality-which
cannot be made susceptible to rational scrutiny. Stephen Carter, Evolutionism,
Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 993-95 (1987); see
also Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997,997 (1987) (Liberalism
cannot genuinely cherish religious belief because liberalism, itself, is informed by a faith
in reason as a faculty that operates independently of any particular world view.); OWEN,
supra note 126, at 7.
558. The absolutism approach would "invalidate any governmental support to
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pays homage to Lemon v. Kurtzman559 and its conception of the purported
separation between church and state,"' yet (1) overly formalistically understates
Jefferson's opposition to the compulsory funding of all opinions that citizens
might disbelieve, while broadly failing to consider Madison's approach to true
freedom of conscience; and (2) fails to appreciate that a consistent examination
of the No Establishment Clause implicates nontheistic and secular faiths as well.
While it is possibly true that "[s]ecularlism is not the future[,] it is yesterday's
incorrect vision of the future,"56' the liberal wing's views taken together or
separately, confirm that the very existence of the Lemon test renders the ideal of
an impenetrable wall of separation between church and state archaic.562 Finally,
the liberal branch could have found constitutional principles to validate the Pilot
Project, if they had been so inclined.563
C. Government Endorsement of Religion?
Laurence Tribe, citing Wooley v. Maynard," states "that individuals cannot
be made the involuntary vehicles of views with which they disagree, so the
experience of living in a political community which endorses or affirmatively
supports religious positions and with which one disagrees may be regarded as a
peculiar offense to freedom of conscience." '565 He makes this argument without
understanding that one's "freedom of conscience" can also be offended by
deontological claims expressed in nonreligious language. Evidently, enthusiastic
religious advocacy in the political realm cannot be condemned consistently with
the Free Exercise Clause; on the contrary, it is the enlistment of the official
apparatus of politics to obtain religious ends, as opposed to secular ends, that is
certain institutions controlled by a church or religious organizations '[e]ven if a
completely secular part of [the institution's services] could be isolated."' Choper, supra
note 391, at 269-70 (quoting GEORGE LANOUE, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PAROCHIAL
SCHOOLS?, at 32 (1968)) (alterations in original).
559. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
560. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,720 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
561. David Brooks, Kicking the Secularist Habit: A Six-Step Program, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 2003, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/03/brooks.htm
562. BELL, supra note 179, at 234.
563. One possibility is the adoption of what McGinnis calls the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence of social discovery that encompasses the extension of protection equally
to nonreligious and religious groups and which seeks to ensure that the Establishment
Clause, Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment "work
harmoniously rather than conflict with one another." McGinnis, supra note 259, at 558-
59.
564. 430 U.S. 705 (1997).
565. TRIBE, supra note 307, at 869 (emphasis added).
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of underlying concern.5 66 While this technique likely represents an unjustifiably
asymmetrical conception of the First Amendment, which constrains government
support of religious but not nonreligious opinion, endorsement is a major strand
of the liberal wing's opposition to school vouchers. Such an approach can
neither be squared with the Rosenberger Court's conclusion that religious and
secular norms must have equal access to government funds, nor be justified by
any reasoned conception of "neutrality." To the extent that the state or the Court
is captivated with this view, it must inevitably take sides.
This conclusion is buttressed by understanding Justice Souter's contention
that the availability of public monies may lead to a contest among religious
groups for support, and opposition from those who fail to share the views of a
given denominational or religious group. He essentially maintains that this
contest is more urgent than other similar contests that are often grounded in
pathological behavior and which plainly afflict all or most majoritarian
democracies.567 Justice Souter argues, for example, that not "all of America's
Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement of the religious Zionism taught
in many religious Jewish schools... [n]or will every secular taxpayer be content
to support Muslim views on differential treatment of the sexes. '5 68 Conversely,
he overlooks an equally controversial question: why should any of these groups
be required to support any ethical or moral views which they disapprove, even
if the objectionable views are couched in secular language? Justice Souter fails
to answer this question directly. Instead, he offers an indirect response.
Apparently following Rawls,569 he insists that diverse viewpoints should be kept
"relatively private."570
566. TRIBE, supra note 307, at 869.
567. See, e.g., Gwartney & Wagner, supra note 79, at 26 (Democracy cannot exist
as a permanent form of government; it can only exist until a majority of voters discover
that they can vote themselves largesse out of the public treasury.).
568. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,716 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
569. Joseph M. Knippenberg, Liberalism and Religion: The Case of Kant, 30
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER 58, 59 (2001) (Rawls articulates a conception of public
reason which evidently 'excludes the religious by drawing the boundaries of public
reason so that comprehensive religious doctrines fall outside them for the most part' or
that the bifurcation of public and private reason marginalizes those 'for whom it is a
matter of religious conviction that they ought to strive for a religiously integrated
existence."').
570. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 716 (Souter, J., dissenting). In actuality, Rawls' views
are perhaps more complex than those of Justice Souter. Rawls contends that religious
matters should be removed from consideration by public reason altogether. See OWEN,
supra note 126, at 108 (citing Rawls). Yet Rawls "sets as one of the primary tasks of the
book Political Liberalism the full inclusion of 'nonliberal and religious views."' OWEN,
supra note 126, at 165; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xl (1996).
Public reason "neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious, or
nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is compatible with the essentials of public
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Justice Stevens concludes that the Court must remain oblivious to (1) "the
severe educational crisis that confronted the Cleveland City School District,""'
and the plight of low-income and largely African-American students, (2) "the
wide range of choices that have been made available to students," '572 and (3) "the
voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over an
education in the public school system." '73 In addition, Justice Souter contends
that the program, which provides $2,250 in student aid to pupils who attend
private schools 74 and more than $4,000 in state aid to those who attend public
schools, favors private school and endorses religion, when the program's only
preference is for low income families who are eligible for greater assistance than
others."' 5 Moreover, Justice Breyer adverts to the dangers posed by vouchers to
the social fabric of the nation in the form of religious conflict without
understanding the corresponding dangers posed by the increasing racial
fragmentation and despair nurtured by public schools. These claims, taken
together, suggest that the dissent ignores the full history and context of the
program, and its contention that the Pilot Project endorses either religion or
religious indoctrination becomes implausibly formulaic. The cultural meaning
of the Pilot Project, properly understood as a device to improve educational
opportunities for disadvantaged children, is inconsistent with the assertion that
the State of Ohio has constructed a program that endorses religion.
Conversely, Justice Souter's professed concern for saving private religion
from baseness is largely consistent with Alan Wolfe's understanding of the
Connecticut Baptists of 1803, who sought "to preserve religion's special mission
against worldly corruption. '76 This apprehension is arguably the converse of the
government endorsement claim and remains a vital and justifiable concern,
because money accompanied by suffocating regulation may subvert the
educational vitality that apparently contributes to the superior performance of
private educational institutions. While this concern may not necessarily implicate
all school choice proposals, it nonetheless deserves serious attention as part of a
reasoned debate about school vouchers. Nevertheless, it is likely that even this
reason and democratic polity." John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 765, 766 (1997). But see OWEN, supra note 126, at 165 ("Many political
theorists appear to be most comfortable in supposing that identity is so very complex and
changing that none of the various components can be said to dominate. But it seems to
me that, in general, the religion that accepts its place in such a scheme-democratically
abstaining from any undue claims to authority-has already been transformed by
liberalism.").
571. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
572. Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
573. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
574. Id. at 705 (Souter, J., dissenting).
575. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
576. Wolfe, supra note 525, at 6.
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anxiety cannot justifiably infarct serious consideration of voucher
experimentation given the countervailing weight that reasonable observers must
attach to the educational dilemma confronting outsiders in our society.
Accordingly, "[p]ermitting that sector of the population arguably most in need
of the educational benefits offered by religious institutions to avail itself of those
opportunities need not be seen as advancing religion particularly where the
voucher programs are neutral as to particular religions," '77 unless one is
predisposed to the opposite view.
D. Precluding School Choice, Reifying Racial Stigma and
Vindicating Intolerance?
It has been briskly argued that the "great ideological struggle between
capitalism and socialism, waged throughout the [past] century, has now
apparently been resolved with a victory for economic and political liberalism. In
the political sphere, the end of the twentieth century signals the ultimate triumph
of liberal democracy." '78 Whether this development will ultimately expand
human freedom or restrain the freedom enjoyed by politically and socially
marginalized groups is open to debate. In an era which celebrates choices and
which evidently chooses to see human beings as simply a bundle of
preferences,579 those who resist this climax of history in either its normative or
instrumental sense, even when animated by the desire to lessen the economic and
social deprivation of outsiders, may find their desires and preferences excluded
from the public square by prevailing adjudicatory norms. This observation
justifies John Stuart Mill's conclusion that "the benefits of constitutional
democracy in government are not adequate to protect [disfavored groups and]
individuals from the coercive power that can be exercised [or authorized] by a
majority. 580
Therefore, despite the possibility that the "law of the Establishment Clause
is irreducibly complex,"58 it is possible that all or part of the "Supreme Court can
better be understood as serving the veiled majoritarian function of promoting
popular preferences [and negative stereotypes] at the expense of minority
interests."'5 8 Supporting this view, a "'self-confirming stereotype' is a statistical
generalization about some class of persons regarding what is taken with reason
to be true about them as a class, but cannot be readily determined as true or false
577. BELL, supra note 179, at 234-35.
578. LOUGHLIN, supra note i, at 3.
579. See Carter, supra note 64, at 45.
580. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: TRUTH, MEANING & PUBLIC
DEBATE 149 (2002).
581. John H. Garvey, The Architecture of the Establishment Clause, 43 WAYNE
L. REv. 1451, 1452 (1997).
582. Spann, supra note 2, at 1974.
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for a given member of the class."5 3 "Observers, by acting on generalization, set
in motion a sequence of events that has the effect of [sustaining] their initial
judgment."5 4 This approach "encourages the reproduction through time of racial
inequality because, absent some [ameliorative policy] ... [such as educational
experimentation], the low social conditions of many blacks persist, [hence] the
negative social meanings ascribed to blackness are thereby reinforced.""5 5 Since
the liberal wing's Establishment Clause jurisprudence fails to deal in a tangible
way with the concerns of outsiders, its arguments and conclusions, in effect, both
contribute to, and sustain the bleak pattern of exclusion and subordination that
is demonstrably fastened to the common public school. Either unconsciously or
inadvertently, the liberal branch's approach impedes the development of social
and economic capital within outsider communities8 6 by preserving racial
stereotypes and stigma 7 in the form of public school conscription that tends to
fortify poor educational performance and segregation." 8 Hence, the divergence
between Establishment Clause "principles" and operative racial marginalization
corresponds to a distinction without a difference.
The liberal wing contends that voluntary parental choice constitutes state
sponsored coercion; claims that a program which provides twice as much state
funding to public schools as opposed to private schools is insufficiently neutral
and thus "coercively" favors private schools; and dogmatically asserts that a "no-
583. LOURY, supra note 14, at 23.
584. LOURY, supra note 14, at 23.
585. J.L.A. Garcia et al., Race & Inequality: An Exchange, FIRST THINGS, May
2002, at 32, 36 (reviewing GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY
( 2 0 0 2 ) ) , a v a i l a b l e a t
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0205/articles/raceexchange.html.
586. Evidently, "much of the nation's social capital-'community connections of
trust and reciprocity'-is spiritual capital produced by community-severing religious
leaders, volunteers, and institutions." John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Three Faith Factors, 149
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5064 (2002) ("Roughly speaking, nearly half of America's stock
of social capital is religious or religiously affiliated ...religion helps people to
internalize an orientation to the public good. Because faith has such power to transform
lives, faith-based programs can enjoy success where secular programs have failed."). The
liberal wing of the Court by precluding government funds may diminish social capital
formation within largely African-American or outsider communities.
587. The creation of stigma is not simply limited to race. "[P]ublic-school policy
can be used as a means of stigmatizing some beliefs and [for] establishing others."
ARONS, supra note 24, at 193.
588. This perspective is arguably consistent with Derrick Bell's conclusion that
"[a] major function of racial discrimination is to facilitate the exploitation of black labor,
to deny us access to benefits and opportunities that would otherwise be available, and to
blame all the manifestations of exclusion-bred despair on the asserted inferiority of the
victims." Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its Legal Legacy, Its Economic
Costs, 33 VILL. L. REv. 767, 767 (1988).
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aid" criterion simplistically precludes choice when a more sophisticated approach
vindicates the religious liberty right of parents.589 These disparate contentions,
framed as principles, should surprise no one. Although at least three members
of the conservative wing of the Court are willing to posit a true neutrality
principle that would permit all forms of aid to religions, as long as they were part
of a larger program,59° it remains doubtful that either the liberal branch or the
entire Court has ever developed effective principles. Thus, when the Justices "do
not like the result to which a principled analysis leads, they [may] simply decline
to reach it."59' This approach has its advantages-the Court can announce a
principle and subsequently amend it through "subsidiary doctrines." '592 As we
have seen, the liberal wing's devotion to "principle" obligates them to remain
invisible to the plight of African-Americans and other outsiders; it implies that
justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. This technique contradicts
Socrates' perspective on justice, but breathes life into Ellul's intuition that
"juridical technique, neutral in itself, serves, the ends of those with power...
[and over time] the state becomes the judge of law and is no longer judged by
it." '593 Liberal justice in the mirror of its asserted aspirations and principles, just
as Thrasymachus predicted, finds the state sporting rather diaphanous clothes.
While it is doubtful that the existing common public school paradigm can
be squared intelligently with the First Amendment's goal of protecting the
individual's right to practice religion, free from governmental interference,594 it
589. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,683-84 (2002) (Thomas,
J., concurring); Choper, supra note 391, at 304-08.
590. Choper, supra note 109, at 1448.
591. Choper, supra note 109, at 1439-40.
592. Choper, supra note 109, at 1442.
593. Jacques Ellul suggests:
First law becomes detached from the norm ofj ustice and reduced to technical
rules applied in a logical manner to all areas of life as a form of
r~glementation .... Second, juridical technique, neutral in itself, serves, the
ends of those with power. Third, the state becomes thejudge of law and is no
longer judged by it fourth because there ceases to be a common measure
between law and man in society, law ceases to be observed and respected
.... Fifth, there often arises an attempt to revive natural law artificially but
this cannot be done as the relation between man and law has, in concrete
social reality, been broken.
Andrew Goddard, The Life and Thought of Jacques Ellul With Special Reference to his
Writings on Law, Violence, the State and Politics, 1995, at 172-73 (unpublished doctoral
thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford)
(translated from French).
594. Hutchison, supra note 50, at 62. For a luminous discussion of these and other
issues, see Hunter, supra note 153, at 68-71. See also Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) ("[I]deologically driven attempts to suppress a
particular point of view are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other
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is possible that, in spite of the existence of America's actual cultural diversity, the
common public school system promotes and enforces "an Icarian flight of the
mind" in the form of the homogeneous intellectual and moral uniformity craved
by Edward Wilson and others.595 Conversely, as John Gray adverts,
[T]hough the fact of cultural diversity is noted often enough, its
political implications are rarely explored. We find the reason for this
strange neglect, I believe, in a doctrine that is held in common by most
modem political thought. It is this modem doctrine or heresy-the
heresy that political orders ought to embody or express the cultural
identity of homogeneous moral communities.596
It is beyond a penumbra of doubt597 that both public schools and "American
democracy [are] today constituted by elites who are charged with policy
deliberation." '598 Therefore the school system is predictably incompatible with
a principled conception of pluralism, diversity or neutrality that contains even a
diminutive quantum of liberty,599 and without which intolerance must inevitably
prosper. Because some voucher proponents prefer to allow parents and children
to choose an alternative source of morality and meaning derived at least in part
from private schools, whether religious or nonreligious, this ongoing debate
implicates the subversive power of religion and other alternative sources of
meaning against an idealized liberal hegemony (morality). When elite
commentators (driven either by majoritarianism or by special interests) insist on
conformity to prevailing viewpoints by alleging that the common public school
is necessary for the maintenance of democracy, school vouchers and other choice
options implicate the clash between the desires of inner-city parents and those
who prefer to confine inner-city parents and their children to captivity in the
existing educational bureaucracy.6"' Consistent with this perspective, resistance
contexts."); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755 (2002).
595. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 264, at 14 ("The dream of intellectual unity first
came to full flower in the original Enlightenment, an Icarian flight of the mind that
spanned the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A vision of secular knowledge in the
service of human rights and human progress, it was the West's greatest contribution to
civilization.").
596. GRAY, supra note 23, at 253-54.
597. My debt to H.L.A. Hart should be obvious. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 119 (2d ed. 1994).
598. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 65, at 169; see also Yack, supra note 117, at
8-9 (summarizing Judith Shklar) ("[T]he predominant opinions in any society will
inevitably reflect the views of the social and intellectual elites who have the greatest
access to public modes of expression.").
599. See Hunter, supra note 153, at 70 (citing the views of Charles Francis Potter).
600. TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001)
("The appeal of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in
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to state funding of the creation of private schools is driven by the conclusion that
alternative institutions may subvert the centralized conceptions of the state that
are embedded within the public school framework. Thus, the charge that "private
schools will ... restrict academic freedom according to their particular
worldview""'' finds reality and actuality, paradoxically enough, in the public
schools. Homogeneity is accordingly substituted for actual diversity, true
pluralism, and a defensible form of neutrality that declines to compel belief. This
paradigm thus appears to operate as a form of:
[t]otalitarianism [that] has been well described as the ultimate invasion
of human privacy. But this invasion of privacy is possible only after
the social context ofprivacy-family, church, association-have been
atomized. The political enslavement of man requires the emancipation
of man from all the authorities and membership[s] ... that serve, in
one degree or another, to insulate the individual from external political
power.60 2
Although one observer imagines that school vouchers "will potentially
increase private power's direct influence over the education of millions of
students, '  currently and for the foreseeable future, all powerful public
education monopolies fail to educate the most disadvantaged students and
enhance racial stigma. Public education, therefore, efficiently operates to ensure
the retention of private power by those students and insider groups who are
already economically advantaged in the (majoritarian and special interest) contest
for economic, political and social power. This conclusion breathes new life into
the assertion that "American liberal thought has had predictably deleterious
consequences-ones that would not have surprised the authors of the Federalist
Papers"6 4 as well as the claim that "[i]ntra-group esteem allocation permits
groups to overcome certain collective action problems that would otherwise make
conflict impossible. At the same time, the desire for esteem provides a new
objective of group conflict-competition over social status."6 5 While opposition
income, minority, and live in low performing districts: precisely the parents who are the
most disadvantaged under the current system.").
601. Green, supra note 217, at 40.
602. ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 202 (1953) (cited in
GARVEY, supra note 353, at 153); see also Carter, supra note 64, at 988 ("Without this
faith in the ability of individual humans to recreate themselves and their world through
dialogue, without this trust in the power of reason to move others to action, liberalism
becomes an impoverished philosophy: either a simple-minded majoritarianism, in which
preferences are aggregated formally ... or a variant of Leninism.").
603. Wilson, supra note 121, at 398.
604. GRAY, supra note 23, at 239.
605. McAdams, supra note 96, at 1083.
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to vouchers and school choice is ostensibly grounded in poignant concern for
outsiders and their children, as well as in a principled conception of the
Constitution, outsiders are nevertheless confronted with deprived schools and
correlatively disadvantaged social circumstances that constitute a threat to their
very existence. Their future, and the future of the "race," must be held captive
to an insistent and deadly liberal embrace.
When students and parents can exit the public school system, educational
bureaucrats listen and react.6"6 When exit remains impossible, they must either
submit or drop out. To be sure, a limited number of voucher plans currently exist
and thus offer alternatives. Intriguingly, the early evidence provides encouraging
results for black parents and students who are currently trapped in under-
performing schools.6"7 However intriguing, given the existing shortage of
alternative schools available within many, if not most, inner-cities, it seems plain
that the difficulty in creating and developing new schools may be a quintessential
component of, and one of the most significant impediments to, a successful
voucher program. Since litigation may constitute a significant barrier to the entry
of new alternative schools,6"8 voucher opponents are likely to generate litigation
and its accompanying uncertainty.6 9 A great deal of this litigation, as well as
much of the decision making, will likely be grounded in strained conceptions of
the First Amendment.6"' This raises the disquieting possibility that reliance on
the First Amendment is simply a talisman, which precludes a reasoned debate
about school choice.61'
606. MYRON LIEBERMAN, PRIVATIZATION & EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 150 (1989).
607. See, e.g., MCGROARTY, supra note 240, at 127-32 (finding significant
education gains for the Milwaukee voucher program and positive gains for the Pilot
Project).
608. Robert Holland, Researchers Callfor Larger Voucher Experiments, SCHOOL
REFORM NEWS, July 2002 (citing PAUL E. PETERSON & WILLIAM G. HOWELL, THE
EDUCATION GAP: VOUCHERS AND URBAN SCHOOLS (2002)), available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artlD=880.
609. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 n.7 (2002); see also
McConnell, supra note 69, at 847 ("Defenders of the status quo-most particularly,
teachers' unions-have responded with lawsuits contending that educational choice
programs that include religious schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.").
610. Recent Case, supra note 278, at 2201.
611. On this possibility, see F. H. Buckley, Behind The Wall, CRISIS, POLITICS,
CULTURE & THE CHURCH, Dec. 2002, at 53-54 (book review). Buckley makes the
followingpoint: Church-state separationists, in opposing parental free choice in the form
of vouchers rest their case on pedagogic and nationalist arguments. The pedagogic claim
asserts that parental free choice would weaken public schools, particularly within the
inner cities, by diverting funds to private and religious schools. Given the weakness of
this argument, the enemies of vouchers are more likely to rely on the argument from
nationalism. They claim that state aid to parochial schools trenches on constitutional
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In light of the possibility that the voucher idea has positive consequences for
outsider groups, it is difficult to be neutral about the largely non-neutral debate
surrounding this idea. Undeniably, the pursuit of convincingly neutral principles,
in the context of this debate, may prove to be an elusive search for an illusion." 2
Conversely, when the voucher debate is properly situated to place the interests
of outsiders at the core and not the periphery of this dispute, reliable evidence
reveals that school choice and educational experimentation have both the purpose
and probable effect of increasing the economic, political and social power of
black Americans. This deduction diminishes the credibility of "judicial [and
other] claims to neutrality"6 3 when expediently attached to resistance to school
choice programs and ideas. Indeed, the school-choice movement, including tax
credits, privately funded vouchers and home schooling, 6 4 if instrumentally
successful, may provide a basis for African-American and outsider independence
from liberal hegemony. Perforce, those committed to the centralizing ideology
associated with the common public school movement should rightly be
concerned about this subversive possibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
What might have been is an abstraction remaining a perpetual
possibility only in a world of speculation. What might have been and
what has been point to one end, which is always present. Footfalls
echo in the memory down the passage which we did not take.6 "
Although "[t]he histories of liberal political thought and revealed religion
have been inextricably intertwined since the birth of liberalism,"6 6 the problem
liberalism confronts today, when attached to "our 'constitutional faith' and...
liberal principles as our 'civil religion' . . . [is that] the liberal state cannot
adjudicate rationally or impartially among the various faiths, as it claims to do,
if it itself rests on one of the competing faiths.1 6 17 Accordingly, "[w]e cannot
institutions that define what it is to be an American. Id. at 53.
612. OWEN, supra note 126, at 7.
613. Wilson, supra note 121, at 385.
614. Ylonda Gault Cavines, in a recent article indicates that of America's two
million homeschooled children, 150,000 are black whereas five years ago, blacks
comprised only one percent of the total. See A Rainbow Coalition, WORLD MAGAZINE,
Sept., 14, 2002, at 12.
615. T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS: 1909-1950,
at 117, 117 (1952).
616. Knippenberg, supra note 569, at 58.
617. OWEN, supra note 126, at 2. It is far from obvious that Owen fully accepts
the claim that liberalism rests on faith. See OWEN, supra note 126, at 2-14. But see
MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 78-79 (1997) ("Nonetheless, a campaign on [civil
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simply embrace liberalism as a faith, as a civil religion, and then speak
intelligibly of the separation of church (faith, religion) and state."6 " Moreover,
"if liberalism deserves to be called a 'civil religion,' then the separation of church
and state is in danger of becoming incoherent and disestablishment of becoming
meaningless." '619 This conclusion implicates the liberal wing's exoneration of
public schools as well as its belief that the plight of outsiders must remain an
irrelevant and an invisible background fact in its deliberations.
While majority culture, in the form of the common public school movement,
has misplaced its power of explanation and prediction and is now confused, self-
contradicting and self-congratulatory, the liberal-legalist order must inevitably
capitulate to the seductive allure of majoritarian fundamentalism, and thus
impose its values on those who are unwilling to surrender to its centralizing
impulse. The liberal order, evidently, cannot appreciate "Einfihlung, the
capacity to sympathetically 'feel oneself' into the views of those whose outlook
differs profoundly from one's own."62 It appears that a veil of invincible
ignorance62" ' has unhappily, yet unavoidably, captured and infused liberal rhetoric
and republican faith.
Thus, "when the last of earth [is] left to discover.., at the source of the
longest river," '622 once the concluding chapter of the American republic has been
chronicled, it is doubtful that the pertinent documents, historical artifacts, judicial
opinions or collective memory will serve to vindicate such contingencies as
actual diversity of belief, democracy, liberty, or the hopes and dreams of
outsiders. Rather, such documentation will likely corroborate Delgado's grim
forecast that race, our most enduring problem, remains as stubborn as ever as
well as Loughlin's intuition that the ultimate danger is that liberal-legalism may
bring about the exact end-despotism--which it was intended to avert. A state
that freezes out the aspirations of African-Americans and other outsiders,
including members of outsider faiths, and then demands that we send our
children to public schools which tenaciously reify subordination, while striving
"to wean them from our faith, has no serious claim on our allegiance. '"623
religion's] behalf is an act of intolerance, an act likely to provoke resistance and to
multiply division among (and also within) the different groups.").
618. OWEN, supra note 126, at 2.
619. OWEN, supra note 126, at 2.
620. Book Review, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2002, at 79 (reviewing ISAIAH BERLIN,
FREEDOM AND ITS BETRAYAL: SIX ENEMIES OF HUMAN LIBERTY (2002)), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/ffissues/ft021 0/reviews/briefly.html#freedom.
621. This phrase reflects my long conversation with Professor Barry Knister.
622. T.S. Elliot, Little Gidding, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, supra note
614, at 138, 145.
623. Carter, supra note 64, at 53.
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